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With the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA") of 2002,
Congress enacted the most sweeping reform of the federal campaign
system in nearly thirty years. Commentators hailed the bill as the "most far-

reaching and controversial attempt to restructure the national political
process in a generation"' and as the answer to Americans' demand for
reform "in order to reclaim the power of their voices and their votes. '"2

When the Supreme Court endorsed virtually the entire bill as constitutional
in McConnell v. FederalElection Commission,3 it set the stage for the 2004
election, the first to be held under the new campaign rules.
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1. Daniel R. Ortiz, The UnbearableLightness of Being McConnell, 3 ELECTION L.J. 299, 299
(2004).
2. Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Decision Today in McConnell v. FEC (May 2,
2003) (quoting statement of Joshua Rosenkranz), at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/
releases_2003/pressrelease_2003_0502.html.
3.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
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Shortly after the Court's announcement, however, policymakers and
jurists acknowledged the pressing need for further reform. 4 For example,
reform groups petitioned the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") to
extend regulation to § 527 organizations. 5 These nonprofit organizations
are not constrained by contribution limitations to the same extent as
political parties and political action committees; they raised hundreds of
millions of dollars to influence the Fall 2004 election.6 Moreover, the 2004
presidential campaign, far from heralding a new era, emphasized the
inadequacy of the presidential public funding system, as three major
candidates-including the two major-party nominees, George W. Bush and
John Kerry-declined federal matching funds during the primary season so
that they could spend unlimited amounts of money before their party
conventions. 7 The Presidential Election Campaign Fund, which provides
public money to presidential campaigns, did not have sufficient resources
in early 2004 to pay what it owed the Democratic candidates who chose to
participate in the system, 8 and it is projected to be insolvent by 2008. 9 In
4. See, e.g., id. ("We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement
on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet.").
5. The FEC complaint was filed by Democracy 21, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Center
for Responsive Politics. See Center for Responsive Politics, CRP Files ComplaintAgainst Section 527
Organizations Using Soft Money for Federal Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, Jan. 15, 2004, at
http://www.fecwatch.org/law/enforce/527orgs.intro.asp. The FEC declined to take action on 527
organizations before the 2004 election, so supporters of both parties aggressively took advantage of this
loophole, making future regulation without congressional action more difficult. See Glen Justice.
Proposal for Political Groups to Rely Less on Soft Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, at Al I
(detailing past regulatory effort and a new proposal by FEC lawyers). The four sponsors of BCRA
introduced the 527 Reform Act of 2004 in September, in part as a response to what they view as an
inadequate regulatory approach by the FEC. See Press Release, Campaign Legal Center, Senators
McCain and Feingold and Congressmen Shays and Meehan Introduce 527 Reform Act of 2004 (Sept.
23, 2004) (providing floor statements, the text of the bill, and analysis), available at
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/press- 1320.html.
6. The Center for Responsive Politics reports that 527 organizations collected and spent over
$600 million during the 2004 election cycle. See Center for Responsive Politics, Total 527 Receipts and
at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527new.asp?
Expenditures, 2003-04, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
cycle=2004 (last updated Feb. 22, 2005); Center for Responsive Politics, 527 Committee Activity: Top
50 Federally Focused Organizations, OPENSECRETS.ORG, at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/
527cmtes.asplevel=C&cycle=2004 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) (providing total receipts of 527
organizations, including more than $66 million in the Joint Victory Campaign 2004, $52 million in the
Media Fund, and $62 million for Americans Coming Together). For discussion of the loophole, see
Edward Foley & Donald Tobin, Tax Code Section 527 Groups Not an End-Run Around McCainFeingold,72 U.S. L. WK. 2403 (2004).
7. See John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward,3 ELECTION L.J. 115,
120-21 (2004) (identifying the presidential system as one of the next targets of reform).
8. Jeanne Cummings, PresidentialCampaign Law Shows Its Age, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003,
at A4.
9. TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION FIN., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., PARTICIPATION,
COMPETITION,
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short, it has become clear that BCRA has not solved the problems of
federal campaign financing, but is only-at best-an interim step in a
continuing process. The challenge now is to determine the shape of the next
reform.
We start with some sense of the limits of past reform. Reform efforts
since the 1970s and through BCRA have been aimed primarily at
preventing quid pro quo corruption of elected officials by special interests
and to combat the appearance of such corruption.10 In McConnell, the
Court accepted the premise that quid pro quo corruption can involve more
than subtle vote-buying and likely often includes preferential access for
large contributors, whose power over the legislative agenda is
disproportionately great." In addition, the Court signaled a concern with
the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form."' 2 Congress has
chosen to combat the multifaceted problem of corruption largely through
limitations on contributions,1 3 thereby reducing the ability of wealthy
individuals and organizations to influence politicians. Furthermore, special
restrictions have been placed on corporate spending since the Tillman Act
of 1907, the beginning of federal campaign finance regulation.' 4 The
presidential system combats corruption in an additional way: by providing
public financing to reduce candidates' dependence on large contributions.
What is missing in the current laws and proposals is an effective
strategy to encourage broader participation in the political process by
individual citizens. Greater participation by individual donors serves the
primary goal of campaign finance regulation-combating quid pro quo
corruption by special interests-because it dilutes their power. Contribution
limits alone will be unsuccessful at eliminating special interest money in
politics because interests wanting to spend large amounts of money to
support or defeat candidates will typically find a way to do so. If the FEC
or Congress shuts off one spigot of unlimited money, then smart election
NOMINATION POLITICS 47 (2003) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS], available at

http://www.cfinst.org/presidential/report/index.html.
10. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
11.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142-51 (2003). Earlier, the Court had described the
corruption concern as "extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of
large contributors." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
12. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). See also McConnell, 540
U.S. at 202-09 (applying the Austin rationale to both corporations and labor unions).
13.
Congress's choice was dictated in part by Buckley, which struck down as unconstitutional
expenditure limitations enacted in 1974 as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act. See Buckley, 424
U.S. at 45.
14. Federal Corrupt Practices (Tillman) Act, 59 Pub. L. No. 36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
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lawyers help their clients find other avenues for their money. 15 Three
decades of campaign finance regulation have taught us this lesson.
Comprehensive reform must use more weapons in the fight against
corruption. In addition to trying to limit the amount of money spent by the
well-to-do, Congress should work to dilute their influence by increasing the
supply of other money into the system.
Second, reform efforts can emphasize more than the goal of
combating quid pro quo corruption. Recent Supreme Court opinions,
particularly those of Justice Breyer, have suggested another objective to be
served in the design of campaign finance laws. In his recent 2004 Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, Breyer argued that regulations can aim "to
democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral
process, thereby building public confidence in that process, broadening the
base of a candidate's meaningful financial support, and encouraging greater
public participation."16 If more citizens participate, the perception that the
system is the property of wealthy special interests will likely decrease, and
ordinary citizens' engagement with the political system generally will
likely increase. In these ways, a normatively attractive vision of
participatory democracy is served by a system characterized by broader
grassroots activity.' 7
We propose a new reform to expand participation in the electoral
process. Our proposal shifts the focus of reform beyond contribution
limitations and toward a mechanism to increase the supply of money to
campaigns and to alter the nature of the new money that enters the political
15. The most substantial loophole evident in the 2004 campaign is the use of 527 organizations
to evade BCRA's provisions. See, e.g.; David S. Broder, What McCain-FeingoldDidn't Fix, WASH.
POST, May 20, 2004, at A29; William March, Independent Groups Eager to Influence, TAMPA TRIB.,
May 9, 2004, at I.
16. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, Harvard University Tanner Lectures on
Human Values 12 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Tanner Lecture], at http://ethics.harvard.edu/
BreyerLecture.pdf. See also Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring); Stephen
Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 252-53 (2002)
[hereinafter Madison Lecture] (articulating Breyer's view that Congress can pass legislation, including
in the campaign finance context, to further a "participatory self-government objective"). Breyer argues
that this view of "active liberty" is at least "plausible [as] a certain view of the Framers' basic intent, a
view that sees the Framers as seeking to create a form of government in which all citizens share the
government's authority, participating in the creation of public policy." Tanner Lecture, supra, at 8. See
also id. at 2-9 (discussing the Framers' view of active liberty).
17. See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-46, 50 (1970)
(describing various theories of participatory democracy and the benefits to citizens and governance).
See also JOHN MUELLER, CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND RALPH'S PRETTY GOOD GROCERY 181

(1999) (describing why participation other than voting may be more important to ensure responsiveness
of elected officials in a democracy).
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system. We advocate adoption of a generous and refundable tax credit up to
$100 annually per taxpayer for contributions to candidates for federal
office and to national political parties. A refundable tax credit is the
equivalent of giving each eligible citizen up to $100 each year to use for
political contributions. Because the objective of this proposal is to expand
the donor base and encourage people who have not before been active to
participate in politics, the design of the tax credit targets it to lower- and
middle-income Americans, providing a refund for those without any tax
liability.
Although some aspects of this proposal are not entirely new,"8 it has
not been seriously discussed at the federal level for nearly twenty years.
18.

A proposal similar to ours has been sketched out by David Rosenberg in an American

Enterprise Institute ("AEI") monograph. DAVID ROSENBERG, BROADENING THE BASE: THE CASE FOR A
NEW FEDERAL TAX CREDIT FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2002). Our analysis is more

comprehensive than Rosenberg's, and we place the proposal in the context of BCRA, which had just
been enacted at the time of his work. Our proposal differs in some respects, but the two approaches are
consistent. Spencer Overton and Thomas Cmar, the latter in his role as a legal analyst for the U.S.
Public Interest Research Group ("PIRG"), have also recently proposed tax credits as ways to expand
participation in campaigns beyond those in the upper-income brackets. Overton calls this group the
"donor class" and worries about the negative consequences on democratic legitimacy if the only people
involved in politics come from this economic class. See Spencer A. Overton, The Donor Class:
Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation,153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 100-04 (2004). For PIRG,
the tax credit is part of a vision of "small donor democracy" and is an interim step toward of system of
public financing and vouchers. Thomas Cmar, Toward a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future
of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 1, 57 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), at
http://ssm.com/abstract=588921. Our focus is different from Overton's and PIRG's because we
approach the tax credit reform through the prism of the traditional concern about quid pro quo
corruption by special interests. We aim our proposal primarily at reinforcing the current reality of the
campaign finance system in which individual giving dominates contributions by corporate and other
special interests, and we seek to expand individual participation to further dilute any effect of special
interests. We believe that our emphasis is more in line with the objectives articulated by legislators and
accepted by courts as a justification for regulation. Overton and PIRG are primarily concerned with the
"intra-individual-donors" dynamics of campaign contributions; that is, they aim their reforms at
reducing the role of the "donor class" in campaign and expanding participation of those who can afford
only modest donations. We share their broader goal of expanding political participation to groups that
have not traditionally contributed to campaigns, and our proposal will improve the campaign finance
system in ways that Overton and PIRG support. See infra text accompanying notes 89-93. Unlike
PIRG, we do not view the tax credit as merely a way station on the road to a voucher system, which we
do not believe is politically viable at the federal level. In addition, we do not advocate changes in
contribution limits or other aspects of the system to allow only very small donations. Finally, David
Gamage has proposed taxing political contributions as a more efficient alternative to contribution
limitations. See David S. Gamage, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in
Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283, 1296 (2004). Because our proposal supplements rather than
replaces contribution restrictions, we do not discuss the Gamage approach. Certainly, much regulation
that takes the form of command-and-control restrictions can be achieved, sometimes more efficiently,
through taxes. We worry, however, that the public perception of any program that taxes contributions
will be that the government generally discourages political donations. This may be precisely the wrong
message in a world of low public participation in campaigns.
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The federal government provided a less generous nonrefundable tax credit
(or, if taxpayers elected it, a deduction) from 1972 until 1986.'9 In addition,
six states offer some sort of tax credit or refund, the first being adopted in
1969 by Oregon and the latest in 2000 by Virginia. 20 Because our proposal
relies on a familiar tool with a well-established means of administration, it
is a more realistic proposal than the complex proposal put forward by
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres to establish a system of "patriot dollars"
and anonymous political donation booths. 2' Although interesting as a
thought experiment, the Ackerman and Ayres approach is purely a
theoretical endeavor with no chance of adoption by pragmatic lawmakers
loathe to try unrealistic, untested, and bureaucratically cumbersome
programs requiring an outlay of $5 billion.22 The simplicity and familiarity
of the nonrefundable tax credit are its strengths.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we draw from social
science work, primarily of political scientists Stephen Ansolabehere, John
de Figueiredo, and James Snyder, and present facts about the campaign
finance system that have been overlooked or misunderstood by most legal
scholars and policymakers. Much of the current discussion of quid pro quo
corruption and the influence of special interests on political outcomes is not
grounded in the reality of the data. The data show that special interests are
less influential in the campaign process than is popularly thought; most
donors are individuals; and most individual donors make relatively small
contributions to candidates and political parties. In Part II, we discuss two
primary objectives that reform proposals should address: combating
corruption and the perception of corruption, and encouraging broader
participation in campaigns, especially by citizens who do not currently
contribute. Both of these objectives are part of the Court's jurisprudence in
this area, although the corruption rationale is the overriding goal of reform
efforts and the more influential rationale in judicial decisions. Part III
briefly describes the current structure of campaign finance regulation on
the federal level after the enactment of BCRA and provides more detail on
the immediate challenges facing the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
system. Finally, Part 1V describes our tax credit proposal in detail and
addresses potential objections.
19.
20.

I.R.C. § 218 (2000) (repealed November 1978).
ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 21 tbl.AI-1 (summarizing tax credit programs in six states).

21.

BRUCE ACKERMAN

&

IAN AYRES,

VOTING WITH DOLLARS:

A NEW PARADIGM

FOR

CAMPAIGN FINANCE 4, 9 (2002).

22. Id. at 7. For criticism of the Ackerman and Ayres proposal on some of the same grounds, see
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Voting with Votes, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1971, 1987-90 (2003) (book review).
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I.

THE FACTS ABOUT CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Basic facts about the federal campaign finance system have gone
largely unnoticed in the debate about effective reform. A recent, important
empirical study, Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, by
Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 23 provides the much needed
foundation of facts about campaign finance that should inform future study
of reform proposals and their consequences. We will highlight two sets of
facts identified and described in the Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder study that we believe deserve greater attention. First, special
interest money is a small portion of the overall campaign finance system,
and it is unlikely that this money causes large distortions in policy. It likely
does have, however, some influence over policymaking that occurs "under
the radar screen" of voters. Second, most money comes from individuals,
and most individuals who participate in campaigns contribute in modest
amounts.
Although we will describe the current federal regulatory structure in
more detail in Part I, an outline of the legal framework is necessary to put
this empirical analysis in context. The campaign finance regulatory
structure first put in place in the 1970s depends on a series of contribution
limits and disclosure rules. Although the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA") initially also included expenditure limits, the Court in Buckley v.
Valeo struck them down on First Amendment grounds.2 4 The Court has
continued to treat limits on contributions differently from restrictions on
expenditures, applying less stringent review to the former than to the
latter. 25 Thus, expenditures by candidates, individuals, and groups are not
limited under current law, but contributions to candidates, political parties,
and political action committees are subject to a series of limitations, most
of which were increased and indexed in BCRA. For example, an individual
can now contribute up to $2000 per candidate per election (before 2004, the
limit was $1000), up to $25,000 to a national party committee (the old limit
was $20,000), and up to $95,000 per two-year election cycle to all
candidates, parties, and political action committees (the old limit was
$50,000).26
Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is There So
23.
Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. EcON. PERSP. 105, 107-08 (2003).
24.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-48 (1976) (per curiam).
25.
For the most recent affirmation of this dichotomous treatment, see McConnell v. FEC, 540

U.S. 93, 134-41 (2003).
26. These amounts will be adjusted for inflation. For an excellent summary of the current law,
with comparisons between the rules before and after BCRA, see THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE,
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Organizations are treated differently than individuals. Corporations,
labor unions, trade organizations, and otlwr groups wishing to contribute to
federal candidates and parties must create segregated funds, known as
political action committees or "PACs", with some exceptions for certain
nonprofit corporations. 27 Organizations cannot give money from their
general treasury funds to a PAC, although they can pay for some
administrative expenses. A corporate or labor PAC must raise money only
from certain people associated with the organization (usually certain
company employees or union members) 28 and those individuals are limited
to $5000 in contributions to each PAC per year. PACs themselves are
29
limited to contributing no more than $5000 to each candidate per election.
Thus, concerns about corporate and other "special interest" influence over
elections have been addressed with two weapons: contribution restrictions,
and the requirement that all corporate spending come through separated,
segregated accounts that are accumulated from certain people associated
with the corporation who know their contributions will be used for political
activities.
Finally, before enactment of BCRA, political parties had access to a
30
source of funds unaffected by contribution caps: so-called soft money.
The soft money loophole allowed political parties to raise unlimited
amounts of money from individuals and organizations to be used to support
nonfederal election activities, build infrastructure, and fund voter
mobilization programs. Soft money was also available to fund political
advertisements that did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
particular candidate when parties produced such ads independently of any
candidate's campaign. In addition, corporations, labor unions, and other
groups could use their general treasuries directly to fund issue
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE EGUIDE, at http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/intro.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2005). For discussion of the regulatory landscape before BCRA, see ANTHONY CORRADO, THOMAS E.
MANN, DANIEL R. ORTIZ, TREVOR POTTER & FRANK J. SORAUF, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A
SOURCEBOOK (1997).
27. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (describing characteristics of
nonprofits that cannot constitutionally be compelled to maintain segregated funds).
28. There are two kinds of PACs and the rules about whom they may solicit differ. Corporate
and labor PACs are the primary focus of our analysis, and the rules limit them to soliciting only their
owners, employees, and members; PACs that are "nonconnected" or independent from a corporation,
labor union, or other parent organization may solicit the general public. CORRADO ET AL., supra note
26, at 124. PACs associated with trade organizations are considered connected and are limited to
soliciting people associated with the parent organization. Id. at 124-25.
29. These amounts were not increased by BCRA and are not adjusted for inflation.
30. For a discussion of soft money, see Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for
Reform, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
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advertisements developed independently of any candidate or federal
3
party. 1
Use of soft money by political parties exploded in 1996, and in the
2000 election it was a primary focus of party fundraising. In that year, the
Democrats raised $246 million in soft money, roughly equal to their $275
million in hard money; the Republicans raised about the same amount of
soft money as their competitors ($250 million), as well as more than $465
million in hard money. 32 Disclosure rules were the only regulation of soft
money and issue advertisements before the 2004 election, but BCRA
closed both loopholes. 33 National political parties can now only raise hard
money, that is, money subject to contribution limitations. Political
advertisements now subject to regulation are those that merely refer to a
federal candidate and are broadcast around the time of an election; they
need not use the "magic words" of opposition or support.34 The data we
will discuss below, however, largely come from elections before BCRA
and include party soft money raised in an environment where savvy
political players could use these loopholes to evade caps on contributions
and contribute unlimited amounts of money.
With this regulatory structure in mind, we can turn to the facts
concerning special interest money in federal elections and the role of
campaign contributions from individuals. The data we will discuss relate to
pre-BCRA elections, so contribution limits were lower than they are
currently (specifically, contributions by individuals to candidates were
capped at $1000) and party soft money could be raised in unlimited
amounts.
A. SPECIAL INTEREST MONEY

In the 1999-2000 election cycle, roughly $3 billion was raised and
spent on federal House, Senate, and presidential offices. One billion was
raised and spent by House and Senate candidates, $500 million by
31. For discussions of issue advertisements, see DEBORAH BECK, PAUL TAYLOR, JEFFREY
STANGER & DOUGLAS RIVLIN, ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN (1997);
JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BUYING TIME: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION (2000).
32.
Michael J. Malbin, Political Parties Under the Post-McConnell Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 177, 181 tbl.2 (2004).
33. For further discussions of the problems of soft money and unregulated issue ads, see
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123-26 (2003).
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) (providing examples of magic
words such as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
'defeat,' [and] 'reject').
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presidential candidates, and $1.2 billion by political parties in hard and soft
money. An additional $235 million was raised by taxpayers through the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund matching system and spent by
presidential candidates. Of the $600 million raised by PACs, only around
$260 million reached candidates and another $21 million was devoted to
independent expenditures. 35 Approximately $320 million of PAC money
was spent on "fundraising and other activities," 36 that is, administrative and
overhead expenses and not direct political contributions.
35. According to FEC data, total reported independent expenditures amounted to just over $23
million during the 2000 election, less than 1% of all money spent. Independent expenditures by PACs
represented just over $21 million, and parties were responsible for over $2 million in independent
expenditures. See Press Release, Federal Election Commission, 1999-2000: Summary of PAC
Independent Expenditures (May 31, 2001), at http://www.fec.gov/press/press200l/053101pacfund/
pacie00.html; Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraising
for 2000 (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Party Fundraising], at http://www.fec.gov/press/
press200I/05I501partyfund/051501partyfund.html. The Congressional Research Service has estimated
that independent expenditures made by PACs and parties in 2000 totaled $26 million. See JOSEPH E.
CANTOR, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS:
OVERVIEW AND ESTIMATES OF THE FLOW OF MONEY CRS-2 (2001). See also Federal Election
Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2000) (defining independent expenditure). It was not until July

2000 that 527 organizations engaged in issue advocacy were required to disclose their independent
expenditures. See Pub. L. No. 106-230, § 2(a), 114 Stat. 477 (2000). Thus, the data are poor with
respect to the precise amount of issue advocacy expenditures by 527 organizations during the 2000
election. The Congressional Research Service, however, relying on various experts, other studies, and
its own analysis, suggests that issue advocacy spending totaled between $100 million and $150 million
in the 2000 election. See CANTOR, supra, at CRS-13 to CRS-15 (discussing findings by the Brennan
Center, the Campaign Finance Institute, the Annenberg Public Policy Center, the Associated Press, and
others). (This figure for 527s is not included in the figures cited in the text because the precise amounts
are unclear, as the law was in its infancy and reporting was not sufficiently uniform.) In this past
election cycle, this figure increased to $386 million (or about 10% of the total money spent) by October
2004. This substantial expansion of independent expenditures is largely due to BCRA's elimination of
political party soft money. For an estimate of the 2004 figures, see Nicholas Zamiska, U.S. Elections
Are to Set Record for Spending at $3.9 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2004, at A4. Most of the money
spent in independent expenditures in 2004 has been raised from individuals, often through extremely
large contributions to 527 organizations by very wealthy donors. See Lisa Getler, With 527s, New
Power Players Take Position, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A16 (noting that at least forty-five
individuals or couples donated $1,000,000 or more to 527s and listing those who gave top amounts
including George Soros and Peter Lewis, who each gave over $23 million); James V. Grimaldi &
Thomas B. Edsall, Super Rich Step into Political Vacuum, McCain-FeingoldPaved Way for 527s,
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2004, at AI (providing data on wealthy contributors, and noting that "six of the
top 10 donors to 527 groups are billionaires, and all are on Forbes magazine's list of richest
Americans").
36. For these figures, see Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 107-08. For a summary of the
campaign finance data, see Party Fundraising, supra note 35; Press Release, Federal Election
Commission, FEC Reports on Congressional Financial Activity for 2000 (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Financial Activity], at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2001/05l50lcongfinact/05150 lcongfinact.html;
Press Release, Federal Election Commission, PAC Activity Increases in 2000 Election Cycle (May 31,
2001), at http://www.fec.gov/press/press200l/053101 pacfund/053101 pacfund.html. In addition, the full
datasets can be downloaded from the FEC Web site. Federal Election Commission, DownloadableData
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What is striking about these figures is that individuals contributed
nearly $2.4 billion of the $3 billion spent in the last election, $235 million
came from taxpayers through the public financing system for presidential
elections, and only $380 million came directly from the treasuries of
corporations, unions, and other associations (in the form of soft money or
independent expenditures). 37 That is, approximately 13% of all money
spent in that election was transferred directly from special interests to
politicians. This figure understates the role of special interests, however,
because some of the money donated by individuals went to PACs and was
then distributed to candidates, parties, or other PACs. Including this $280
million in the "interested money" category increases the amount of
"interested" money to only $660 million, or 22% of all money contributed
to campaigns.
This 22% figure may still understate the amount of money associated
with corporate or other interests. Some of the individuals contributing
money directly to federal campaigns should likely be considered as part of
a special interest because their giving is motivated by their relationship
with a corporation or other entity that seeks influence in Washington
through the coordinated contributions of individuals, as well as through the
contributions of its PAC. We will return to this practice of "bundling"
when we discuss the nature of individual giving. 38 As we will discuss
below, however, most individuals make contributions of modest size,
suggesting that their donations are not part of a coordinated strategy to gain
disproportionate influence. 39 Each larger contribution by an individual (say,
up to the pre-BCRA maximum of $1000) represents less than 0.25% of the
$405,000 it took in the 1990s to run the average campaign for a House
seat 4° (and less than 0.05% of the $1.98 million it took to run the average
large individual contributions
Senate campaign), and thus even 4relatively
1
likely exert little, if any, influence.
About Candidates and Committees, FEC.Gov, at http://www.fec.gov/finance/newftpl.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Data].
37. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 108; Data, supra note 36.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 95-103.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
40. All numbers represent averages for 1992-1998 elections. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note
23, at 123; Financial Activity, supra note 36; Press Release, Federal Election Commission, Six Year
Financial Summary for 2000 Campaigns Through December 31, 2000 (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Six
Year Summary], at http://www.fec.gov/press/press200l/05l501congfinact/sixyearsenate.html.
41.
Bundling these larger contributions can result in coordinated giving of money in sums
important to candidates and parties, and some of these bundles are undoubtedly ways that special
interests provide money to campaigns outside the PAC structure. It is difficult to determine how much
special interest money enters the system through bundling, but it does mean that our figures for special
interest giving are somewhat understated.
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The fact that individuals are the mainstay of the campaign finance
system is largely lost in the literature. Much of the press and scholarship
and many judicial opinions have focused on the corrupting influence of
special interests in the campaign system.4 2 It is important to underscore,
however, that these special interests represent only about 22% of total
money in the system, and this percentage has not shifted drastically since
1980. 4 3

This reality raises the question posed by the Ansolabehere, de
Figueiredo, and Snyder empirical study: if money has the profound
influence on outcomes that critics of the system claim, why is there not
substantially more money in politics from groups seeking to gain
government benefits? 44 Special interests could easily and quickly have
given more to politicians in the 2000 election through various legal
mechanisms, but they chose not to do so. First, they could have channeled
more money to politicians and parties directly from corporate treasuries
through soft money contributions. These contributions, while required to be
disclosed, were not capped and thus could have been legally contributed in
unlimited amounts. 45 If money buys significant policy change, surely there
would have been more soft money funneled to the parties before it was
prohibited by BCRA.
Second, special interests could have given significantly more money
to candidates through the PAC system of hard money. Only 4% of PAC
contributions to House and Senate candidates were near the maximum of
42. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
457 (1 st Cir. 2000) (quoting various newspapers about the undue influence of special interests as part of
the justification for upholding a state law limiting campaign contributions); J. Skelly Wright, Money
and the Pollution of Politics:Is the FirstAmendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 609 (1982); Jay Heck, Capitol CorruptionStill Business as Usual, CAP. TIMES & WIS. ST. J.,
July 3, 2004, at 9A; Thomas E. Mann & Norman Ornstein, So Far, So Good on Campaign Finance
Reform, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,2004, at A19.
43.
See JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN FEDERAL
ELECTIONS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND ITS OPERATION CRS-39 tbl.6 (1995). In contrast to our

conclusion, PIRG has concluded that only 60% of money in the campaign system comes from
individuals. ADAM LIoz, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL

ELECTIONS 10 (2003). This figure, which suggests that up to 40% is from special interests, can be
misleading. PIRG examined only hard money contributions. Much of soft money during the elections
through 2000 came from individuals, which is not included in the PIRG data. In addition, the data
comes from the 2002 election cycle, which means that total spending was likely about two-thirds of
what it would be in a presidential election year. Finally, in a presidential election year, there is public
financing that further increases the amount of noninterested money in an election.
44. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23 (discussing reasons why larger donors do not donate
more money). These scholars were answering the question posed by Gordon Tullock in The Purchase
of Politicians, 10 W. ECON. J. 354 (1972).
45. See CORRADO ET AL., supra note 26, at 171-73.
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$10,000, assuming both a primary and general election. The average PAC
contribution was $1700.46 Given that the average cost of running a House
campaign in the 1990s was about $405,000, and a Senate campaign cost
about $1.98 million, the average PAC check covered less than 0.42% of a
House campaign and less than 0.09% of a Senate campaign. 47 If PACs had
contributed the full $10,000 to the candidates to which they did contribute
some money, then PAC giving would have been six times higher (or $1.6
billion) than it was in the 2000 election.
One might counter this analysis by arguing that PACs would have
given up to their contribution limits if the rules had allowed them to raise
more money from individuals eligible to donate to PACs. Given constraints
on the supply side, this argument continues, PACs cannot reach the
maximum contribution levels allowed by law. Again, the facts decisively
undermine this argument. Federal law permits corporations, unions, and
trade associations to directly pay some overhead, administrative, and
fundraising costs of their PACs. 48 If special interests wished to
instantaneously increase PAC giving, they could have covered much of
their fundraising costs with distributions from general treasury funds,
freeing up around $300 million to be used for additional campaign
contributions to candidates. PACs raised a total of $579.4 million; thus,
directly paying some PAC operating costs from general treasury funds
could have more than doubled the amount of money available to influence
electoral outcomes. 49 PACs and their sponsors, however, have not pursued
this simple strategy to spend more money without raising an additional
50
dollar from individual contributors.
Thus, special interests could quickly inject substantially more money
into the campaign finance system if they found such investments profitable,
but their PACs have not chosen to do so. Likewise, if special interests felt
they were overinvesting in candidate campaigns, they could contribute
substantially less, but they have not chosen to do this either. This suggests
46. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 108-09.
47. See Financial Activity, supra note 36; Six Year Summary, supra note 40.
48. See Establishment of Political Action Committee and Employee Political Giving Program by
Corporation, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n (1975), reprinted in CORRADO ET AL., supra note 26, at 130,
130-33; ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACS AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING LAWS: USE OR

ABUSE OF POWER? 12-13 (1986) (describing the "SUN-PAC" Advisory Opinion as providing a way for
corporations to "circumvent contribution ceilings"). See also JAN WITOLD BARAN, THE ELECTION LAW
PRIMER FOR CORPORATIONS 7-8 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the expenses that a corporation can pay

directly for a PAC and the process of doing so).
49. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 109.
50. See CANTOR, supra note 43, at CRS-38 tbl.5 (showing that the percentage of money spent on
fundraising and overhead has remained relatively constant over the past twenty years).
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that special interests have found some optimal level of campaign giving to
obtain whatever the money buys. Thus, there is a second issue on which we
must bring facts to bear: what exactly are special interests using this level
of campaign contributions to accomplish? Special interests are
sophisticated political players, and they are strategic in determining their
level and targets of funding. 51 It is certainly possible that the amount of
money they spend is precisely calibrated to achieve certain goals, and that
citizens and reformers could view these objectives as corrosive to
democratic principles. Money could corrupt politics in three ways. First, it
could affect actual policy outcomes. Second, it could affect who is elected.
Third, it could affect the policy process. We consider each possibility in
turn.

1. Changing Votes with Special Interest Money
There are numerous studies that claim that small amounts of PAC
contributions buy enormous amounts of policy.5 2 For example, one author
estimated that a "$3,000 sugar PAC contribution maps into a yes vote [with
regard to a $5 billion sugar subsidy] with almost certainty." 53 This would
mean that $192,000 in PAC contributions by the sugar industry would buy
it a $5 billion sugar subsidy over five years. Another study of gun control
legislation found that $285 in campaign contributions would result in a 3%
change in the probability that a legislator would vote for gun control. This
finding means that to buy a legislator's vote with certainty would cost
approximately $28,215. 54 Given that some of the policy votes analyzed
51. See generally Kevin B. Grier & Michael C. Munger, Comparing Interest Group PAC
Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986, 55 J. POL. 615, 616, 637-40 (1993); James
M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-

1986, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1195, 1196-97 (1990).
52.
See, e.g., John P. Frendreis & Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and Legislative
Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 SOc. ScI. Q. 401 (1986); Woodrow Jones, Jr. &
K. Robert Keiser, Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money, 68 SOC. SC. Q. 170 (1987); Laura I.
Langbein & Mark Lotwis, The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U.S.
House, 1986, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 413 (1990); John McArthur & Stephen V. Marks, Constituent Interest
vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 461 (1988); Thomas
Stratmann, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions
Matter?, 77 REV. ECON. & STATS. 127 (1995); Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy
Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345 (2002);
Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and
Votes, 57 S.ECON. J. 606 (1991) [hereinafter Deciphering].
53.
Deciphering, supra note 52, at 615.
54. Laura I. Langbein, PACs, Lobbies, and Political Conflict: The Case of Gun Control. 77 PUB.
CHOICE 551, 562-64 (1993) (providing the $285 figure and accompanying statistics). Buying an
opposing legislator's vote with certainty would require a 100% vote, which is 3% x 33. At $285 per
each 3%, the cost is $28,215 for the vote.
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were decided by a difference of about ten votes, the author implies that had
gun control proponents contributed $300,000 to legislators, they would
have purchased federal gun control legislation.5 5 Such statements by
small amounts of
scholars and the press have led many to believe that
56
change.
policy
sweeping
and
money can buy important
A survey of the literature demonstrates that these cases are outliers.
One of us, as a co-author of the Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
study, examined over forty statistical academic studies that explored
hundreds of votes on the floor of Congress. 57 Seventy-five percent of the
studies had statistically insignificant coefficients or wrong signs on the
variables of interest. 58 Most of the remaining studies used incorrect
statistical methods. Using these incorrect methods, Ansolabehere, de
Figueiredo, and Snyder replicated the earlier studies that showed that small
amounts of money bought congressional votes. 59 They then used correct
statistical methods on the same data and showed that small amounts of
money do not buy congressional votes. The study demonstrates how
important it is to separate the effect of "giving money to our friends [even
if] it doesn't change their vote" from the effect of "giving money to
marginal legislators to change their vote."60 A great deal of the former goes
on in Congress; not much of the latter can be detected. This leads us to
believe that it is unlikely (though not impossible) that money buys "big"
votes in Congress.
2. Buying Elections with Special Interest Money
If there is no statistical relationship between special interest giving
and voting behavior when proper statistical methods are used, then perhaps
special interests are more sophisticated in deploying their campaign
resources. They do not try to buy individual votes; rather, they buy
elections. 6 1 Those who advocate this election rationale to explain political
55.
Id. at 557 (showing the vote splits at ten votes). Multiplying these swing votes by $28,215
per vote equals almost $300,000. This is the implied cost of "swinging" the legislature to gain control.
56.

See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE CORPORATE WELFARE PROJECT, RETURN ON INVESTMENT: THE

(1997)
(linking specific provisions in a budget bill to corporate interests who contributed soft money); Jeffrey
Sparshott, House Approves Corporate-TaxBreaks, WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at C8 (linking action
on a tax bill to contributions by corporate interests).
57. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 112-17.
58. Id. at 114.
59. Id. at 114-15.
60. Id. at 116.
61. Lowenstein has referred to these different strategies as "legislative strategies" (vote-buying)
and "electoral strategies" (affecting who is elected). See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign
HIDDEN STORY OF SOFT MONEY, CORPORATE WELFARE AND THE 1997 BUDGET & TAX DEAL
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contributions argue that interest groups do not need to buy votes because
they can, instead, just buy legislators. Numerous empirical studies have
found that party affiliation can explain an enormous amount of variance in
voting behavior. 62 These results suggest that ideology drives votes; thus,
corporate and other interests can determine a candidate's ideology through
party affiliation and other information and use their wealth to guarantee
that the people elected will share their political perspectives. This argument
continues that special interest money does not merely buy elections, but it
is also used to form war chests that deter other people considering entering
a contest. That is, an incumbent who has accumulated a large campaign
fund (assumedly from special interests) can deter quality candidates from
entering the race and thereby ensure reelection. 63 Thus, special interest
money buys both the current election and deters challengers in future
elections.
This argument, however, does not accord with the empirical reality.
Social science studies have shown that, once a requisite minimum has been
collected, money in a political war chest does not substantially affect
election outcomes. Statistical studies have shown that an additional
$100,000 (25%) in campaign spending has no more than a one percentage
point effect on the overall outcome of a typical House race (in the
Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 308 (1989). See also
Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, IntractableDilemmas, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1258, 1272 (1994) (making the distinction); Note, The Ass Atop the Castle: Competing
Strategies for Using Campaign Donations to Influence Lawmaking, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2610 (2003)
(analyzing the two strategies). It appears that one of the major concerns animating the tax credit
proposals of Overton and PIRG is the belief that money is being used to buy elections. See Overton,
supra note 18, at 86-89; Cmar, supra note 18, at 1-8. Their claim is not, however, that special interest
money determines elections, but rather that the candidate with the most money is vastly more likely to
win the election, and that the money is raised from wealthy individuals, not from Americans of all
economic and social classes. To that extent, Overton and PIRG propose reform mainly to serve equality
objectives, not to combat quid pro quo corruption by special interest groups. See, e.g., Cmar, supra note
18, at 44-45 (discussing why minimizing PAC influence "'solves' the wrong problem"). Although we
share the goal of increasing participation among Americans who do not currently give, we believe that
an overriding concern of campaign finance reform through history has been to rid the system of
disproportionate influence by corporate and other special interests. See supra note 18 (discussing
differences in emphasis between our approach and those of Overton and PIRG).
62. See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 113 tbl. 1 (listing over thirty studies that find a
significant relationship between party affiliation or ideology measure and voting).
63. See, e.g., Robert K. Goidel & Donald A. Gross, A Systems Approach to Campaign Finance in
U.S. House Elections, 22 AMER. POL. Q. 125 (1994); Edie N. Goldenberg, Michael W. Traugott &
Frank K. Baumgartner, Preemptive and Reactive Spending in U.S. House Races, 8 POL. BEHAV. 3
(1986); Philip L. Hersch & Gerald S. McDougall, Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in
CongressionalRaces, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 630 (1994).
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observable ranges).6 4 The political landscape is strewn with politicians who
spent millions of their own money and special interest money-even
millions more than their opposition-and still lost. 65 Thus, individual or
even groups of special interests will have a hard time affecting the outcome
of most races. But do teeming war chests deter quality challengers? Again,
studies have found that incumbent war chests do not affect the quality of
challengers, and that they do not deter high quality challengers from
entering the race. 66 Moreover, war chests usually consist of money
remaining from a previous election campaign in which the incumbent faced
a relatively weak challenger. 67 To the extent that war chests are collected,
for
there is considerable evidence that candidates intend to use them to run
68
effect.
deterrence
immediate
any
provide
to
than
higher office, rather
Our analysis to this point has looked largely at the average behavior of
special interests and politicians. This may not be the best way to think
about special interest money. To better determine whether special interests
pursue some kind of election strategy, we should examine how they behave
on the margin. 69 That is, on the margin, PACs should adopt strategies of
deploying their political contributions so as to maximize their returns. This
analysis reinforces our conclusion that money cannot buy elections. Two
pieces of data provide some evidence that, on the margin, special interestsdo not change their giving patterns to affect electoral outcomes and,
accordingly, that politicians do not rely on special interests to win.
A first piece of evidence comes from the supply side of funds in
Senate races. The cost of running a senatorial campaign differs widely
64.
See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign
Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House, 102 J. POL. ECON. 777, 780 (1994).
65.
See Jennifer Steen, Maybe You Can Buy an Election, But Not with Your Own Money, WASH.

POST, June 25, 2000, at B 1 (discussing the unsuccessful campaigns of self-financed millionaires as well
as some of their successes).
66.

See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Campaign War Chests in Congressional

Elections, 2 Bus. & POL. 9 (2000); Jay Goodliffe, The Effect of War Chests on ChallengerEntry in U.S
House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. So. 830 (2001); Jonathan S. Krasno & Donald Philip Green,
Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections, 50 J. POL. 920, 930-31 (1988); JEFFREY MILYO,
THE ELECTORAL EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN HOUSE ELECTIONS: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT

APPROACH 18-21 (Tufts Univ. Dep't of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 98-06, 1998), at
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/9806.pdf.
67. Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 66, at 10; Jay Goodliffe, Campaign War Chests and
Challenger Quality in Senate Elections (2002) (unpublished working paper), at http://fhss.byu.edu/
polsciIGoodliffe/papers/wcsenate4.pdf.
68. They may deter "low quality" challengers, who cannot raise money, but there is no
demonstrated deterrence effect on "high quality" challengers. See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note
66, at 19, 28-29.
69. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 124-25.
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across states. For example, in 2000, Dianne Feinstein's California
senatorial campaign cost $10.4 million, of which $8.2 million was raised
from individuals and $2 million from special interests. In that same year,
Olympia Snowe of Maine ran a reelection campaign that cost $2.2 million,
of which approximately $1 million came from individuals and $1 million
from special interests. Conrad Burns of Montana also ran a reelection
campaign that cost $3.9 million, of which $2 million came from individuals
and $1.9 million from special interests. 70 Given this financial reality, if
special interests could overcome collective action problems and wanted to
"buy" a senator, how would they allocate their money? Clearly, the most
rational strategy on the margin is to concentrate money on the race in the
low population state where campaigns are cheap and to put no money in an
expensive state where the same expenditure of money will be only a small
percentage of the total campaign funds raised. Yet, we do not observe
PACs engaging in the "rational" strategy of moving money from California
to Wyoming. Instead, special interests contribute roughly the same amount
to each Senate candidate (approximately $1 to $2 million). 7 '
A second piece of evidence comes from the demand side of funds in
House races. When politicians find themselves in very close races, they
demand more money for their campaigns. During the 1990s, the average
House race was decided by seventeen percentage points. 72 The average
amount spent in a House race was $810,000. 7 3 In races decided by more
than thirty percentage points, only $396,000 was spent; but in races decided
by less than five percentage points, $1.3 million was spent. 74 The closer the
race, then, the more money spent by candidates. From whom does a
candidate raise additional funds when demand for money grows? The
money on the margin does not come from special interests through PAC
contributions; rather, the money comes from individuals. The data show
that the importance of individuals in campaign finance grows as the
demand for cash increases. In House races decided by a margin of thirty
percentage points or more, 48% of campaign funds came from individuals
and 46% from PACs. In House races decided by five percentage points or
less, 60% of the campaign funds came from individuals and 31% came
70. Six Year Summary, supra note 40.
This fact has been documented for Senate races throughout the 1980s, controlling for other
71.
factors. See Snyder, supra note 51, at 235-36.
72. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 123.
73. Id. at 123. See also Data, supra note 36; Press Release, Federal Election Commission, House
Non Incumbent Winners and Their Opponents Median Disbursements (May 15, 2001), at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2001/05150 lcongfinact/housenonincummedian.html.
74. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 123-24.
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from PACs, with most of the difference in the share from individuals
accounted for by contributions of less than $500.15 These relatively modest

contributions, well under the statutory cap of $1000 applicable to these
races before BCRA, are unlikely to represent coordinated contributions that
might disguise special interest money as individual donations. In short, on
the margin it is individuals, not special interests, that provide the necessary
money in close elections.
3. The Subtle Influence of Special Interest Money on the Policy Process
A third possibility is that money affects political activity that occurs
"under the radar screen." Thus, the influence of special interests does not
result in major policy change, but it does cause small dislocations in
76
observed policy, and perhaps larger dislocations in unobserved policy.
Even these dislocations, however, must be relatively minor; otherwise, we
would observe substantially more money flowing into the campaign system
and more special interests involved in obtaining such benefits. Because this
kind of nonsalient policy change is hard to detect, reformers and jurists
who point to the "potential for corruption" as a justification for regulation
are often referring to the likelihood that small favors are granted to a
privileged few in subtle, easily overlooked ways.
How might interest groups exercise this kind of influence? One of the
more obvious benefits that campaign contributions may garner is privileged
access. Groups that give money are more likely to gain access to the
politicians so they can communicate their point of view and affect the
policy agenda. 77 There is some empirical analysis that suggests that groups
with relatively few members but that intend to engage in substantial
lobbying of Congress are more likely to contribute to congressional
campaigns than are other groups. 78 The implication is that they gain access
to lawmakers that they would not be able to obtain otherwise because they
do not have many members who are constituents of key members of
75.

Id. at 124.

76. Cf KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 396-98 (1986) (finding, in a classic study of interest group influence, more influence on
the details of policy that are not salient to voters). See also Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 126
(mentioning this possibility).
77. For an example of a mathematical model illustrating how money buys access, see David
Austen-Smith, Campaign Contributionsand Access, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 566 (1995).
78. See Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr. & Micky Tripathi, Are PAC Contributions
and Lobbying Linked? New Evidencefrom the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act, 4 BUs. & POL. 131, 151-52

(2002).
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Congress. 7 9 Although access does not necessarily mean that the politician
will vote with the group, it does mean that the politician may consciously
or unconsciously act favorably to the group's interest by inserting language
into bills or voting on amendments or issues that are not salient to her
constituents. This worry about privileged access is the main aspect of the
legislative process that the McConnell Court viewed as giving rise to the
80
appearance of political corruption.
Political contributions could affect the legislative process in a second
"under the radar screen" way. Money could be buying the effort and time
of politicians to work behind the scenes on issues important to particular
interest groups. The politician may not adopt a different view on an issue,
but might work harder to pass certain legislation or to bring an item to the
top of the agenda with the additional incentive of PAC support in elections.
Indeed, it has been shown that politicians tend to spend more time and
engage more actively on particular issues in committee if special interests
have given them money. 8' This kind of legislative work usually occurs in
committees, which interest groups monitor but ordinary voters often do not,
or even behind closed doors in party caucuses, summits, task forces, or
informal negotiations. This behavior might include exerting influence
during a mark-up of a bill, slowing a bill or speeding it up at a key
vetogate, or placing crucial language in a bill or a committee report.
A third way the political process may be affected in a relatively
undetectable way is in the pressure politicians can bring to bear on
regulatory agencies. Sometimes this pressure is obvious to voters; for
example, when legislators pressure agencies in high-profile oversight
hearings. But, in most cases, influence brought to bear on the executive
branch can be extraordinarily difficult to discover. The actual policy
change that congressional influence causes is frequently unobserved
because it may be subtle or occur at a sufficiently later time to escape being
linked to the legislator's action. Given the pervasiveness of the regulatory
process and its effect on special interests, it is possible that special interest
mnoney may be mainly buying legislative favors, indirectly, in
79. Others have argued that these types of contributions are better characterized as "symbols of
reciprocated good will," like fruit baskets or Christmas cards. Jeffrey Milyo, Bribes and FruitBaskets:
What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean?, 4 Bus. & POL. 157, 157 (2002).

80. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123-25, 145-52 (2003).
81.
See David P. Baron, Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral
Equilibrium, 104 Q.J. ECON. 45 (1989); Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed
Interestsand the Mobilization of Bias in CongressionalCommittees, 84 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 797 (1990).
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administrative agencies and other entities in the executive branch.8 2
Writing in the wake of the Keating Five scandal of special interest
influence through campaign contributions, Dennis Thompson terms this
kind of corruption "mediated" or "institutional" corruption in which public
officials use their office to bring inappropriate pressure to bear on other
governmental actors for the benefit of favored constituents. 83 He notes that
the public official's role "is filtered through various practices that are
otherwise legitimate and may even be duties of the office. As a result, both
the official and citizens are less likely to recognize that the official has
84
done anything wrong."
In sum, what do we know about the role of special interests in
campaigns? As Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder note, and we find,
special interests contribute around one-quarter of the total money in federal
campaigns, and that portion has remained relatively constant for nearly
twenty-five years. Although special interests could legally, easily, and
quickly inject substantially more money into the campaign finance system,
they do not. The claims by the popular press, reformers, and some scholars
that small amounts of interested money buy major changes in policy or buy
elections find little support in the data. When they are in close elections and
in great need of more money, politicians turn their attention to raising
money from individuals. More generally, special interest money is not the
marginal money in campaigns. What does money buy? It likely buys
access, small favors, energy in casework, intercession with regulators, and
a place on the legislative agenda. It also adds to an overall "appearance of
corruption" in a democratic system. Interestingly, the evidence relied on by
the Court in the most recent campaign finance case upholding BCRA is of
exactly this sort of activity-there is no evidence of outright vote-buying or
crucial support in an election.
B. INDIVIDUALS IN THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM
About three-quarters of political campaign funds come from
individuals, mainly in very small amounts. Survey research, conducted
82. For a well-documented example of this pressure in Congress's oversight of the Federal Trade
Commission, see Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the FederalTrade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
83.

See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL

CORRUPTION 7 (1995).

84.

Dennis F. Thompson, Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five, 87 AM. POL. SCI.

REV. 369, 369 (1993). See also Ronald M. Levin, CongressionalEthics and Constituent Advocacy in an

Age of Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing similar problems in casework, another "under
the radar screen" activity in many cases).
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during the 2000 election and discussed in the Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo,
and Snyder study, found that 10% of Americans over the age of eighteen,
or 21 million people, gave to political candidates, party committees, or
political organizations. 85 The average contribution of an individual,
therefore, was $115 in the 2000 election. Of the total amount donated, $1.1
billion went directly to candidates, $700 million to political parties, and
$600 million to PACs.86 Other studies also emphasize the dominant role of
small contributions by individuals. The Campaign Finance Institute found
that 629,499 donors contributed directly to presidential campaigns in the
1996 election cycle; in 2000, 834,287 contributed to the campaigns. In
1996, 547,384 of those donors contributed less than $250; in 2000, the
figure for such contributors was 568,913. That is, 87% of individuals
donating to the presidential campaign in 1996 gave less than $250, and
80% in 2000 made donations of that size. In fact, of the donors who gave
$100 or less in 1996, the average contribution to these campaigns was
$62.27, and the average in 2000 of those who gave $100 or less was
$49.23.87 Although these figures encompass only hard money contributions
by individuals to the presidential campaigns, they show that the majority of
individuals participating in political campaigns do so though relatively
modest contributions that are clearly insufficient to corrupt politicians or
88
the political process.
85. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 108.
86. Id.
87. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS, supra note 9, at 105.
88. It is extraordinarily difficult to determine the precise number of people contributing to
federal candidates in an election and the size of these contributions. Federal campaign finance law
requires disclosures only of contributions exceeding $200. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at
108 n.3. Scholars have used several different methodologies to determine the number and distribution
of contributions. One method, used by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder, combines survey data
and the individual donor files and other data from the FEC to determine how much money was given by
individuals. See id. at 108. Using this method, these authors estimate that $2.4 billion in the last election
came from individuals. As noted in the text, we also know from survey data that 10% of Americans
over the age of 18, or 21 million people, donate in political campaigns. See id. at 108 n.3 (providing
cites to surveys). Dividing $2.4 billion by 21 million yields a contribution of $115 per person. There are
advantages and disadvantages to this method. One advantage is that it includes all money in federal
campaigns-hard, soft, PAC, and individual. A second advantage is that it uses multiple methods of
data collection (surveys, FEC data, and aggregate data) to arrive at a number. One disadvantage to this
method is that it allows us only to obtain the average. We can say little about the variance and skew in
the distribution of individual giving. That limitation is less relevant to our analysis, which focuses on
the relationship between special interests and individuals in campaigns; it is more relevant to work that
emphasizes differences among individual contributors. See supra note 18 (differentiating our emphasis
from that of Overton and PIRG). A second disadvantage is that the surveys generally ask if the
respondent has given money to a candidate in the last election, which could be a federal, state, or local
candidate. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257-58 (1992). For example, National Election Studies posed the following
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questions to survey participants: "During an election year people are often asked to make a contribution
to support campaigns. Did you give any money to an individual candidate running for public office?";
"Did you give money to a political party during this election?" Id. National Election Studies also uses
coding in their surveys: I if yes to either question, 0 if no to both questions. Id. Thus, studies using this
survey data in their calculations probably understate the average federal contribution.
A second method to determine how much people give is used by PIRG. PIRG determines that
$1.01 billion was given to candidates in the 2002 federal election. See Lioz, supra note 43, at 16. We
discuss the drawbacks of PIRG's aggregate and percentage estimation procedure, supra note 43; for this
analysis, however, we will assume that its figures are correct. PIRG relies only on the FEC data to make
this determination, and the data it uses include only hard money to congressional candidates (which
may bias the results). Because federal campaign laws do not require disclosure of donor information for
contributions of less than $200, PIRG is unable to determine the number of donors who give; thus, it
makes no claims about the mean level of giving by donors. Because PIRG does know the total amount
of hard money and the amount of money from individuals in amounts over $200, however, it is able to
determine the skew of individual giving. PIRG finds that over 465,000 (0.22% of the voting age
population) "Americans made a contribution of $200 or more to a 2002 congressional candidate." Id. at
15. From this, PIRG is able to determine that 76% of contributions in the 2002 congressional elections
were from donors who gave more than $200. Id. at 16. This method, however, also has disadvantages;
primarily, it does not reveal how many people participated in financing campaigns. The Ansolabehere,
de Figueiredo, and Snyder study reveals that it is likely that millions of people gave relatively modest
amounts to candidates. In the end, we believe that both approaches to determine how many individuals
participate in campaign donations and in what amounts have advantages and disadvantages, and that
both approaches support some of the same conclusions: namely, that substantial numbers of Americans
give in small amounts and that these donations are not large enough to buy policy as special interest
money is thought to do.
Our conclusions about the mix of contributions differ from those of some other legal scholars,
notably Overton, supra note 18, and Cmar, supra note 18. We believe the explanation for the
differences turns on two factors: first, almost all the data they rely on were generated by a limited
number of sources, some with a strong particular advocacy position that may call into question the
data's precision; and, second, some of their data is limited to highly qualified samples (such as
contributors of over $200), from which the authors tend to generalize. For example, Overton cites an
Associated Press ("AP") article that notes that "[1]ess than 2 percent of the voting-age population gave
to a presidential or congressional candidate in the 1999-2000 election cycle." Anne Gearan, Supreme
Court Eves Campaign Finance Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 5, 2003, cited in Overton, supra note
18, at 75 & n.8. The AP article further reports, however, that "Lelighty percent of those donors, or about
2.7 million people, gave less than $200, the Supreme Court was told in legal filings." Gearan, supra.
Although the AP's information is incomplete because it does not include money PACs raise from
individuals, does not include soft money contributions, and measures percentages as voting-age
population rather than registered voters, it does support the general thesis of our argument that most
Americans are giving very small amounts to candidates. Moreover, much of the data cited in these
papers comes from a handful of sources. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 18, at 76 n.10, 86, 102 n.108
(using work by Clyde Wilcox primarily, but also citing the PIRG Education Fund study on the 2002
election, discussed above, supra note 43); Cmar, supra note 18, at 2 (using the PIRG Education Fund
study, discussed above). See also Clyde Wilcox, Alexandra Cooper, Peter Francia, John C. Green, Paul
S. Herrnson, Lynda Powell, Jason Reilfer & Benjamin A. Webster, With Limits Raised, Who Will Give
More? The Impact of BCRA on Individual Donors, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN
CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 61, 64-65 (M.J. Malbin ed., 2003) (describing survey
methodology). To get a clearer picture of the campaign finance system in the United States, one must
rely on many types of data gathered from many types of sources (for example, survey and archival
sources). In our judgment, the data we use attempt to do this and, thus, likely create a more complete
picture of campaign finance in the United States, subject to the limitations we discuss above.

HeinOnline -- 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 613 2004-2005

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:591

Although most who contribute to campaigns do so through relatively
modest contributions, it is also clear that many individuals participating in
politics in this way are not average Americans. Those with adjusted gross
incomes ("AGI") over $100,000 ($200,000 filing jointly) represent about
4% of the U.S. population, but account for 43.7% of the hard money donors
to the 2000 presidential campaign. 89 Only 6% of people with incomes
under $15,000 contribute to campaigns, contrasted to 56% of those with
incomes over $75,000.90 Some campaign finance activists have noted this
An often-cited figure in studies used by the other legal scholars is that "only 4% [of Americans]
made a contribution of any size to a federal, state, or local candidate." See, e.g., LIOZ, supra note 43, at
15, 62 n.8. This claim, and others like it, come from DAVID DONNELLY, JANICE FINE & ELLEN MILLER,
MONEY AND POLITICS: FINANCING OUR ELECTIONS DEMOCRATICALLY 7 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 1999). An examination of the Donnelly, Fine, and Miller book itself reveals no indication of how
this number was calculated, which the authors provide for the "1996 election cycle." Id. A footnote near
the discussion reveals that their "discussion of these flows [of money] draws principally on research and
documentation by the Center for Responsive Politics," and the authors cite the Center's Web site and a
study called The Big Picture: Who Paidfor the Last Election. Id. at 92. The methodology for this figure
is provided on the Center for Responsive Politics' Web site. Center for Responsive Politics, The Big
Picture: 1996 Cycle Donor Demographics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, at http://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/DonorDemographics.asp?Cycle=1996&filter=-A (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). It includes hard
and soft money contributions of $200 or more-not all contributions-to federal candidates, parties,
and PACs. The statistics in the Donnelly, Fine, and Miller book generally are not well-sourced, but they
apparently all are based on the Center's Big Picture project. The Donor Demographics figures
calculated by the Center are the percentage of U.S. adults who contribute $200 or more, and thus they
systematically overlook smaller contributions. See id. Donnelly, Fine, and Miller have an explicit
agenda to push public financing of campaign. Indeed, the book describes them as follows:
Lead authors and campaign finance reform activists David Donnelly, Janice Fine, and Ellen S.
Miller think we should finance candidate elections with public money by providing
candidates with subsidies on condition that they restrict spending and limit fund-raising from
private sources .... At the time their work was initially published in the Boston Review (April
1997), the authors were fresh from a ballot initiative victory for this style of reform in Maine
(Donnelly managed the campaign); in the November 1998 elections, they registered similar
victories in Massachusetts and Arizona.
Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Preface to DONNELLY ET AL., supra, at i, xiv. While we certainly do not
argue that authors, even those of scholarly work, should not advocate policy positions, we believe that it
is especially important that the data be transparent and well documented before such data are relied on
for policy recommendations.
89. People with incomes of over $100,000 provide 95% of hard money contributions over $1000
to presidential campaigns. These wealthier people also provide 84% of contributions between $200 and
$999, but they provide only 32% of the contributions of less than $200. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION
POLITICS, supra note 9, at 106. Mapping these data on the previous presidential campaign data in the
Campaign Finance Institute ("CFR") report, id. at 104, and assuming the $200 contribution cutoff in the
National Election Studies is roughly equivalent to the $250 contribution cutoff in the CFI report, then
we can conclude that people with incomes over $100,000 represent 43.8% of all hard money donors to
presidential campaigns. The calculation is as follows: (.95 x 112,365) + (.84 x 43,024) + (.84 x 9,221) +
(.32 x 669,677) = 364,930 (total donors with incomes over $100,000 in 2000); dividing this figure by
total donors (834,287) yields 43.7%. Id. at 105-06.
90.
AMERICAN

See TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS'N,
DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 7 (2004) [hereinafter AMERICAN

DEMOCRACY],

available at http://www.apsanet.org/inequality/taskforcereport.pdf.
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trend and have argued that the skewed distribution of those active in
campaigns undermines the legitimacy of democratic institutions. 9 1 Our
empirical project is different from theirs and is tied to analyzing, and
rejecting, the most frequent characterization of our campaign finance
system: that it is dominated by corporate and special interests that drown
out the voice of individual citizens. That claim does not accurately portray
current financing of campaigns. Other scholars and activists are concerned
with the distribution of giving among all individual contributors and are
primarily interested in addressing equality concerns. Although our proposal
also responds to their egalitarian objectives, 92 our primary interest
empirically and normatively lies in responding to claims of undue influence
by corporate and other special interests in the political realm 93 and to
broadening participation in politics by those who are not currently
involved.
The importance of contributions from individuals increased in the
2004 election, in part because of the changes in the soft and hard money
regulations. BCRA not only eliminated soft money, but it also raised the
hard money limits and indexed them for inflation. Virtually all contribution
limits were raised by BCRA, except for the limits that apply to
contributions to and by PACs. In other words, the new law increases the
power of individuals relative to PACs. Thus, as parties work to replace soft
money, they are expanding their individual donor base and working to raise
94
more hard money contributions from all sources.
Political scientists forecasting changes in political behavior after
BCRA had predicted that additional hard money contributions were most
likely to'come from wealthy individuals who had been previously active in
politics, both because they would be willing to spend more and because
candidates and parties would target them.9 5 The brief experience postBCRA demonstrates that this prediction was partially accurate. Candidates
vigorously encouraged supporters to "bundle" large individual
91. See Overton, supra note 18, at 100-04; Cohen & Rogers, supra note 88, at xii.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 222-224.
93. Although some refer to wealthy individuals as "special interests," see Grimaldi & Edsall,
supra note 35 (quoting Benjamin Ginsberg's characterization of wealthy people funding 527s), it is our
view that most of the discussion of special interests focuses on the role of corporate and other organized
interests.
94. See, e.g., Glen Justice, Despite Loss of Soft Money, PartiesAre Collecting More Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at A18 (describing current efforts by parties to broaden their bases to replace soft
money).
95. See, e.g., IDOZ, supra note 43, at 35 (predicting that higher hard money limits "will further
marginalize small donors"); Wilcox et al., supra note 88, at 61.
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contributions. Bundling is a practice that circumvents limitations on
contributions by PACs because it allows coordination outside the PAC
structure. Bundling permits an interest group to deliver multiple individual
contributions to a candidate at the same time or in a relatively short period
of time so that the interest group gets "credit" for the bundle. In some
cases, the checks are physically delivered at the same time; in other cases,
another way of tracking the contributions is used. Some of the bundled
individual contributions should be considered disguised special interest
spending because they are coordinated by collective entities to replicate
what is done formally through the PAC structure. It is difficult, however, to
measure the extent of bundling because no law requires candidates or
groups to report bundling, although some campaigns have voluntarily
revealed information about their use of this fundraising strategy.
Bundling is a bipartisan phenomenon and has been part of the federal
campaign system for years, 96 although it is increasingly important because
of BCRA. President Bush formed a new donors' club to take advantage of
bundling under the new hard money rules. In addition to the "Pioneers"-a
group active in both his 2000 and 2004 campaigns with members who each
raised at least $100,000 in bundled contributions for his campaign-he also
recognized people who bundled over $200,000 for his 2004 presidential
campaign as "Rangers." Each Pioneer or Ranger was given a tracking
number that had to appear on checks received by the campaign in order for
the fundraiser to get credit.97 Achieving the status of a Pioneer or Ranger
was worth more than the right to buy a set of silver cuff links or a belt
buckle with the Lone Star of Texas engraved on it; one-fifth of the Pioneers
are lobbyists who presumably participated, at least in part, to obtain access
98
to the White House.
Democrats and groups associated with them also worked to
aggressively encourage coordination of large individual donations. The
Kerry campaign recognized as campaign "Vice Chairs" supporters who
raised at least $100,000 in bundled contributions. Kerry periodically
released the names of his Vice Chairs, revealing that many were trial
lawyers, members of the telecommunications industry, or active in groups
with interests related to recent Senate Finance Committee work, a
96. See LISA ROSENBERG, A BAG OF TRICKS: LOOPHOLES IN THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM
pt.4 (1996), availableat http://www.openscrets.org/pubs/law-bagtricks/contents.asp.
97. See Glenn Justice, Even with Campaign Finance Law, Money Talks Louder than Ever, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at A16 (noting that President Bush doubled the number of Pioneers and Rangers
from 2000 levels in a campaign that set fundraising records).
98. See Thomas B. Edsall, Sarah Cohen & James V. Grimaldi, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then
Capitalize,WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at Al.
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committee on which Kerry sits. 99 Although Kerry had trouble attracting
Vice Chairs early in his primary campaign, by the summer his staff
reported more than sixty such bundlers, some of whom had raised much
more than the requisite $100,000. Kerry's running mate, John Edwards,
also relied on bundling, particularly from100law firms, to raise money in his
initial quest for the top spot on the ticket.
Some politically liberal PACs have also encouraged supporters to
make additional individual contributions to particular candidates as part of
a bundling strategy. EMILY's List, an organization that works to elect
women candidates who support reproductive rights, has long taken the lead
in promoting bundling and has consistently opposed any legislation to
discourage the practice. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
("ATLA") uses a technique to track bundled donations similar to Bush's
campaign; that is, ATLA encourages those cooperating with its strategy to
contribute an odd amount, say, $1912. It can then use publicly available
information about donors' occupations as well as the particular amounts of
the donations to pinpoint who is part of their bundle and inform
candidates.' 0 ' The conservative Club for Growth, which espouses an antitax platform, has used EMILY's List's techniques as a model to bundle
$3.2 million in 2002.102 Unlike the presidential campaigns, however, some
groups on both the left and the right target people who will give far less
and Vice Chairs work to raise
than the legal maximum; Rangers, Pioneers,
10 3
time.
a
at
check
$2000
money one
But the predictions about the shape of fundraising in the wake of
BCRA failed to anticipate the substantial increase of new donors and
relatively small contributions. At the same time they encouraged bundling
of large donations, all candidates and both parties also worked in the 2004
election to expand their bases of those who give more modest amounts. In a
world of only hard money for parties and candidates, a larger donor base
99. See Thomas B. Edsall, James V. Grimaldi & Alice R. Crites, Redefining Democratic
Fundraising, WASH. POST, July 24, 2004, at Al.
100. See By "Bundling" Small Checks Partisans Undercut Reforms, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2003,
at A10 [hereinafter Bundling]. See also Lisa Getter, Surprisingly Efficient Money Machine Still
Running, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2004, at A17 (detailing fundraising strategies of Kerry and Edwards,
including the use of bundling).
101. See ROSENBERG, supra note 96, at pt.4 (detailing bundling strategies of EMILY's List and
ATLA).
102. Bundling, supra note 100.
103. See Press Release, Campaign Finance Institute, CH Analysis of the Presidential Candidates'
Financial Reports Filed July 20, 2004 (July 23, 2004) [hereinafter Financial Reports] (noting that most
of Kerry and Bush's large contributions were in $2000 increments), at http://www.cfinst.org/
pr/072304.html.
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now, even of people giving small amounts, can. be used in the future to
encourage larger donations. In addition, the fact that many people are
participating in a campaign through small contributions signals to voters
that the candidate enjoys grassroots support. Not surprisingly, then, all
other things equal, politicians prefer individual money to corporate money
and want a significant portion in small donations. Furthermore, the process
of raising money from many citizens can help in every candidate's ultimate
goal: getting the largest number of votes. Of course, candidates value the
efficiency of raising money through bundling; otherwise they would not
create Republican Rangers and Democratic Vice Chairs. The point is only
that a campaign needs a mix of donations and prefers that most come from
individuals.
In the 2004 presidential race, the candidates of both parties generated
record numbers of small donations. 1°4 At the end of the nominating
process, the presidential candidates of both major parties had raised a
combined total of $205 million in contributions of $200 or less, quadruple
the amount raised in the 2000 presidential election. Such small donations
made up 34% of all contributions from individuals, as compared to 25%
four years before. 105 The national parties reported that contributions of less
than $200 had doubled compared to the last presidential election campaign,
providing $64.4 million to, the Democratic National Committee and $117
million to the Republicans. 10 6 The Republican National Committee
received donations from more than 1 million first-time contributors during
the first three years of Bush's term, with an average contribution of just
under $30. 107 Bush's campaign collected money from more than 1 million
donors from every state and county in the country. 10 8 To provide a
comparison, by July 2004 Kerry had raised six times the amount of money
through small donations than Al Gore and Bill Bradley did together in
2000.109 Democratic candidates like Howard Dean and Dennis Kucinich
104. This reality in 2004 is different from the description Rosenberg provides when he argues that
politicians have "shunted aside" small 'contributors, an argument for which he provides little data.
ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 3. The facts do not support Rosenberg on this issue even with respect to
the situation before 2004, when BCRA's prohibition of soft money further increased the importance of
a large donor base of hard money contributors.
105. See Press Release, Campaign Finance Institute, Funds Doubled, Small Donations
Quadrupled-But Mostly After Nominations Decided I tbl.3 (Oct. 4, 2004), at http://www.cfinst.org/
pr/100404.html.
106. See Edsall, supra note 6.
107. See ANTHONY CORRADO, NATIONAL PARTY FUNDRAISING REMAINS STRONG, DESPITE BAN
ON SOFt MONEY (Brookings Inst. Governance Study, 2004).
108. See Glen Justice, Bush Drew Record $259 Million During Primaries,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2004, at A24.
109. Financial Reports, supra note 103.
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received substantial press for the plethora of small donations made to their
campaigns, many raised over the Internet." ° For example, more than 60%
of the over $52 million raised by Dean came in increments of $200 or less;
and Kucinich's campaign received 68% of its donations in checks of that
size, albeit for a much smaller total. 11 1
Why did 21 million people give a total of over $2 billion to federal
political candidates in 2000, with many more people likely to have given in
2004? Survey research indicates that people contribute because they are
ideologically motivated, because they are engaged and excited about a
particular election, because they are asked to donate by friends, and
because they want to have their voices heard. 1 2 In other words, political
giving is a form of consumption for individuals. 1 13 They do not expect to
obtain a particular benefit from the money given; rather, they give because
they feel like participating in the political process. 114 Indeed, people who
give money are more likely to participate in other ways, such as by
watching political programs, talking to friends about politics, attending
political meetings, and (perhaps most importantly) voting. 115
110. See Howard Dean, We the People (Who Write Small Checks), WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at
A16. See also infra text accompanying notes 129-138 (discussing the role of the Internet in raising
small donations).
111. Financial Reports, supra note 103, at tbl.3.
112.

See NAT'L ELECTION STUDIES, NES CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP: A REvEw 58-59, at

http://www.umich.edu/-nes/resources/papers/sapintro.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter NES
CONTRIBUTIONS]; ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 1-70, 128-209; SIDNEY VERBA, KAY
LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN

POLITICS 134-39 (1995).
113. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 125.
114. NES CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 112, at 56-57 (referring to "civic duty" as a reason people
give for donating money); ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 19-20, 146-47.
115. In this sense, political giving is like giving to charity. Indeed, politicians discovered that after
September 11, 2001, citizens shifted a substantial amount of money from political giving into charitable
giving. See Allison Stevens, Despite Terrorism Candidates Make Slog, Return to Fundraising,THE
HILL, Oct. 24, 2001, at www.hillnews.com/102401. One concern that may arise with our proposal is
that by making it more attractive to give money to politicians, individuals will substitute political giving
for their current charitable giving. In that case, charitable giving would decline. We do not think this is
a serious issue because, as we will discuss, political giving up to $100 per eligible taxpayer will be
essentially free under our proposal for eligible taxpayers. See infra text accompanying notes 222-224.
Interestingly, charities, even traditional 501(c)(3) groups, are increasingly vehicles used to circumvent
campaign regulations and sometimes to obtain deductions for political contributions. See Frances R.
Hill, Softer Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 32 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 27
(2001) (discussing the various kinds of nonprofits active in politics); Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous
Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611 (2003) (same). Although our
proposal allows favored tax treatment for some political contributions, its effect on the use of nonprofits
as a conduit of political spending is likely to be small. Because our tax credit is targeted to lower- and
middle-income Americans, it is probably not available to those who currently use charities to obtain a
tax deduction for political giving. More importantly, charities are attractive political vehicles to some
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Overall, we find that the majority of money in the federal campaign
finance system is donated by individuals. These contributions come in
small amounts from about 10% of the population." 6 Once the facts of who
pays for politics are understood, then reform proposals can be assessed
more realistically. Some might use our analysis to argue that regulation of
the campaign finance system is unnecessary. 1 7 If special interests are not a
substantial threat to the political system and individuals are the dominant
force in campaign financing, they would contend, regulation is not justified
given its burden on political speech and association. Because political
contributions and expenditures implicate the First Amendment, restrictions
that reduce the amount of this form of political speech face heightened
judicial scrutiny, more strict for expenditure limits but still significant for
contribution caps. If the current primary justification for campaign finance
laws--quid pro quo corruption-lacks the force reformers claim, then it is
less likely to support significant regulation of the campaign finance arena.
We believe that is the wrong lesson to draw from our analysis for two
reasons. First, although the data show that special interests provide only
about one-fourth of the money in campaigns, this money likely influences
policy. Such influence may be felt only in relatively minor ways or subtly
in the process of agenda-setting and regulatory oversight, but such
influence is disturbing nonetheless in a democratic system where money is
not supposed to buy political favors. Special interests are aware of this
effect of their contributions, and they spend hundreds of millions of dollars
in campaign contributions seeking these favors. Not only does this reality
distort the political system, but it also creates in the public a perception that
the system is corrupt. Although the current perception of corruption is
based in part on an inaccurate vision of the reality of campaign finance, the
influence that special interest dollars exert on low-level policy is
nonetheless disturbing and would also feed the distrust of citizens in their
institutions of governance.
people not because of the deduction but because some nonprofit organizations allow donors to shield
their identities. See ELIZABETH GARRETT & DANIEL A. SMITH, VEILED POLITICAL ACTORS: THE REAL
THREAT TO CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE STATUTES (USC-Caltech Ctr. for the Study of Law and Politics,

Working Paper No. 13, 2004).
116. Given that approximately 50% of registered voters on average participate in a presidential
election, and most people who give are likely to vote, then approximately 20% of people who
participate in the electoral process contribute money to campaigns.
117. For an argument against any regulation of political spending, although not necessarily from a
perspective grounded in the empirical reality of campaign money, see BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE
SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001); Lillian BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not
Senator Buckley's FirstAmendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127 (2004).
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Second, the political landscape would surely be very different in a
world of no regulation, as the country had before the Tillman Act of 1907
and as continued even after passage of that law until more effective rules
were enacted by FECA in the 1970s.118 The historical record is replete with
examples of outright corruption, 119 and while the world is different today,
we suspect that a complete absence of regulation would worsen any
corrupting effects of corporate and other interest group spending in
elections.
Although we do not draw from these facts that the right policy
response is no regulation, we do argue that the current system of regulation
is incomplete and it is not sufficiently guided by the realities of political
giving. Moreover, the fact that individuals who contribute modest amounts
are the major force paying for politics suggests that properly crafted
reforms could nurture and expand this characteristic of electoral politics,
bringing in people who do not usually participate in the political process.
Indeed, given the incentive that politicians already have to encourage small
donors to participate in campaigns, reforms in this direction may be
effective in part because sophisticated political players will take advantage
of them to meet their demand for money. To set these facts in context
before we present our tax credit proposal designed to achieve expanded
participation, we next turn to the jurisprudence of campaign finance and
two of the important objectives served by regulation. Increasing the already
growing base of small donors is consistent with both the objective of
combating corruption and its appearance and the objective of
democratizing the campaign process.
II. OBJECTIVES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Campaign finance reform efforts have been fueled primarily by
concerns about corruption. The quid pro quo corruption rationale
articulated by courts since Buckley v. Valeo identifies a subtle form of
pressure exerted by large contributors on elected officials, a pressure
similar to bribery but difficult to police through traditional bribery and
118.

See

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr, CASES AND

MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

228 (3d ed. 2001)

(discussing early campaign finance laws).
119.
For discussions of corrupt corporate influence in politics that led to the enactment of the
Tillman Act, see MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAMPAIGN

FINANCE REFORM ch. I (forthcoming 2005) (detailing the history of federal campaign finance regulation

before FECA); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate PoliticalSpeech, PoliticalExtortion, and the Competition
for CorporateCharters,69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1131-35 (2002); Adam Winkler, The Corporationin
Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1243-47 (1999).
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unlawful gratuities laws. 120 In addition, reformers have often cited
considerations of equality, arguing that influence in the political realm
should not be tied to one's economic position and that the wealthy ought
not to be able to voice their political opinions more loudly than those
without financial means. 12 1 Egalitarian ideals have informed public
financing reforms in the states, for example, and they form part of the
foundation for the presidential campaign financing system. The Court has
not been particularly sympathetic to the state's interest in political equality,
122
rejecting it in Buckley as a justification for expenditure limitations.
Nonetheless, a slightly different but related state interest has been
articulated in recent campaign finance cases, particularly in the opinions of
Justice Breyer, and it was discussed in the legislative debate surrounding
passage of BCRA. It is an interest in democratizing the political process
and enhancing participatory self-government. 123 We will analyze these two
interests1 24 in the light of the facts presented above. Furthermore, we will
suggest how they relate to a proposal designed to provide incentives to
more citizens to donate to candidates' campaigns.
A. COMBATING QUID PRO Quo CORRUPTION BY DILUTING THE
INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS

Traditionally, courts have viewed campaign finance reform as aimed
at quid pro quo corruption, and often at corporations and other wealthy
interests as the primary source of political corruption. Consistent with the
empirical findings above, the conception of troubling corruption has
developed over time to include not merely vote buying, but preferential
125
access and a greater ability to influence the legislature's policy agenda.
The subtlety of quid pro quo corruption and the difficulty of proving actual
120. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000).
121.
See, e.g., Symposium, Money, Politics, and Equality, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1603-2021 (1999).
122. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[Tihe concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.").
123. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence ofMcConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,44,57-60. (2004).
124. We do not claim that these are the only interests that could support campaign finance
regulations, but only that they are important ones. For discussions of an additional vital state interest,
that of improving voter competence through disclosure statutes, see Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with
Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011 (2003). Our proposal here has no direct bearing on the informational
interest served largely through disclosure statutes in both candidate and issue campaigns. We think it
likely that voters who participate more in politics are likely to take more of an interest in politics and
may well use voting cues more effectively, but more work is required to test these hypotheses.
125. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124-26 (2003) (describing access as the objective
of large soft money contributions).
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examples of corrupt outcomes also led to the Court's formulation of the
concept as both actual corruption and its appearance. As it wrote in
Buckley, "[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from
public awareness of the opportunities for
abuse inherent in a regime of
126
large individual financial contributions."'
Congress has chosen to combat quid pro quo corruption and its
appearance largely through restrictions on the size of contributions and
requirements that corporations and other groups like labor unions fund their
political activities through segregated funds consisting of money raised
solely for political activity and governed by contribution limitations.
Although that choice has been partly driven by the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, which subjects contribution restrictions to less rigorous First
Amendment scrutiny than expenditure limitations and has allowed
relatively more regulation of corporations than other entities, early reform
efforts before Buckley and its progeny also tended to prohibit or restrict
contributions and target mainly corporations. Although this kind of
regulation is one avenue to combat corruption and its appearance, it is not a
sufficient answer to the problem. The difficulty lies in the ingenuity of
political actors to circumvent campaign finance rules and in the "hydraulic"
1 27
nature of political money.
With each successive reform effort, those who want to spend
substantial amounts of money in political campaigns find new outlets for
their funds. Early laws like the Tillman Act and the Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925 were easily evaded because of their vague language. FECA,
enacted in 1971 and amended in 1974, was bypassed in a variety of ways,
including the use of independent expenditures to benefit candidates and
soft money contributions to political parties. BCRA seeks to regulate some
independent expenditures, through the requirement that corporations and
unions use segregated funds to pay for broadcast advertisements that
mention federal candidates and are aired close to elections, and through
aggressive disclosure requirements applied to all such electioneering
communication. The Act also shuts off the supply of soft money to political
126. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. The appearance of corruption is a problematic justification for
regulation because survey data suggests that the public finds contributions that fall within current
federal restrictions as evidence of a corrupt political system, particularly when many of the interests
participating in campaigns are the well-to-do. See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of
Corruptionand Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines ConstitutionalLaw, 153 U. PA.

L. REV. 119, 141-44. (2004).
127. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
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parties. Yet, BCRA left loopholes to be exploited by savvy political
operatives. Those who want to spend unlimited amounts of money to
influence political campaigns have turned to nonprofit organizations, and in
particular, 527 groups.
We are not arguing that regulations restricting campaign contributions
are meaningless. They certainly shape the way groups spend money in
campaigns, although not necessarily for the good. For example, one can
argue persuasively that BCRA has empowered interest groups relative to
political parties, a development that may reduce the ability of parties to
serve as intermediaries among groups that tend to focus more on single
issues rather than a larger political agenda.' 28 Some of the new channels
that political money finds may be less regulated by disclosure laws and
thus more problematic, from both corruption and voter competence
perspectives, than the channels through which it flowed before the
regulation. These unintended consequences of regulation must be
considered as they occur and often require regular revision of the campaign
laws to plug loopholes or expand disclosure. Nonetheless, we are not
arguing that restrictions on contributions have no positive effects on the
influence of wealthy interests on campaigns; certainly they do. But we do
contend that such regulation alone will never completely solve the
problems of actual corruption and the appearance of such because the
system is complex and fluid enough to allow circumvention.
Accordingly, campaign finance regulation aimed at corruption will be
enhanced if it is expanded to include strategies to increase the participation
of more individuals in financing political campaigns. In that way, the
influence of special interests will be diluted by the infusion of new
financial resources into the system. In some respects, this strategy merely
emphasizes the current reality of federal campaign financing where
contributions by individuals are the main source of federal campaign funds
and where the average contribution is relatively small. An effective way to
increase such donations is to make giving easier and cheaper; another is to
design a system where it is in the interest of sophisticated political players
to encourage more donors to become involved in politics. As we discussed
in Part I, the latter occurred in 2004 because of BCRA's elimination of soft
money. The use of the Internet for fundraising demonstrates how making
128.

See Nathaniel Persily, Soft Parties and Strong Money, 3 ELECTION L.J. 315, 321 (2004)

("The BCRA 527 loophole will have replaced the FECA soft money loophole as the avenue for
otherwise regulated or prohibited contributions and expenditures. [In that case,] the money will have
been pushed from the most accountable and integrative incarnations of the party toward the less
accountable and more factionalized incarnations of the party.").
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contributing much easier for people can increase the number of citizens
contributing and the number of those making modest contributions.
The Internet is a very recent phenomenon in the campaign finance
system; Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis identify 2000 as the year when
the Internet began to dramatically affect political campaigns.' 29 Thus, data
about its effects on fundraising are still relatively anecdotal. Once the FEC
ruled in 1999 that funds raised over the Internet could qualify for the
presidential matching system, 130 savvy presidential candidates began to tap
the potential of this technology in their race for money. Congressional
candidates had first used the Internet to raise money in 1998, but the
explosion in its use in these races also came in 2000 and after. The Internet
reduces the transaction costs of donating because it makes it simple for
citizens with access to the Web to donate at any hour of the day using their
credit cards. In 2000, Democrat Bill Bradley raised more than $600,000 via
the Internet from 3700 donors, and Republican George Bush averaged
about $200,000 to $300,000 in online contributions after each e-mail blast
the campaign sent to supporters.' 3 1 The Internet allowed candidates to raise
substantial amounts of money immediately after a big win or positive
development in their campaigns; for example, John McCain took in $1.4
million in online donations within three days after his success in the New
Hampshire primary in February 2000.132
Third party candidates have also been able to harness new technology
to compete more cheaply against well-funded, established opponents. In the
presidential system, it is difficult for third party candidates to qualify for
129. BRUCE BIMBER & RICHARD DAVIS, CAMPAIGNING ON-LINE: THE INTERNET IN U.S.
ELECTIONS 3-4 (2003). See also RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET'S IMPACT ON
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 108-09 (1999) (discussing the influence of the Internet on
campaign finance before 2000); Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, Campaigning on the Internet in the Elections of
1998, in DEMOCRACY.COM.: GOVERNANCE IN A NETWORKED WORLD 99 (Elaine Ciulla Kamarck &
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2000) (describing the use of the Internet in 1998, the first election where it
played any sort of role).
130. The ruling came after the request of Bill Bradley's presidential campaign. See Ryan P.
Winkler, Note, Preserving the Potential for Politics Online: The Internet's Challenge to Federal
Election Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1878 (2000).

131.
BIMBER & DAVIS, supra note 129, at 39. John McCain was the most successful online
fundraiser in 2000, raising about 25% of his total funds over the Internet, compared to Al Gore who
raised 3.5% of his total and George Bush who raised .5% of his (although both raised more in absolute
terms). See Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, Political Campaigning on the Internet: Business as Usual?, in
GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY INTHE INFORMATION AGE 95 (Elaine C. Kamarck & Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. eds., 2002).
132.
BIMBER & DAVIS, supra note 129, at 39. See also MICHAEL CORNFIELD, POLITICS MOVES
ON-LINE: CAMPAIGNING AND THE INTERNET 55 (2004) ("On-line fundraising allows success to be

converted quickly into spending money.").
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federal matching funds, so they are entirely dependent on the money they
raise from individuals and groups. For political outsiders like Ralph Nader
in 2000, the main purpose of a campaign Web site is to raise money. 133 The
Internet is not a panacea for minor party candidates and does not entirely
level the fundraising ground, but it can provide additional funds and get the
candidate's message out to voters who surf the Web to discover more than
the two major parties.' 3 4
The importance of online political contributions jumped in the 2004
election. All the presidential candidates, Democrat and Republican, raised
more of their campaign funds over the Internet than in the past. For
example, in March 2004 Kerry raised $26.7 million of that month's total of
around $38 million through online donations; on March 4 alone, days after
Kerry did well in ten state primaries and caucuses held on the same day, the
campaign raised $2.6 million over the Internet. 35 Kerry's successful use of
the Internet continued until the day he accepted the Democratic
nomination, when his campaign took in a record $5.2 million in online
donations. 136 In the end, Kerry, the best-financed presidential challenger in
history, raised a record-setting $82 million online. 1 37 It seems also that
fundraising over the Internet accounted for some of the increase in small
contributions by first-time donors in 2004. The Kerry campaign's March
figures for online fundraising include 900,000 donors who gave around
$100 each. 138 Both Bush and Kerry coordinated online fundraising with email blasts to encourage supporters to visit their Web sites and make quick
contributions.
Internet fundraising demonstrates even at this early stage the power of
reducing transaction costs of donating, particularly with regard to relatively
small, essentially "impulse" contributions. Reformers should learn this
lesson and consider proposals that would further offset the cost of a
political donation. Our tax credit proposal, for example, essentially gives
eligible taxpayers $100 in additional income to contribute to federal
candidates or national parties, thus encouraging broad participation through
133.

BIMBER & DAVIS, supra note 129, at 60.

134. Id. at 164; DAVIS, supra note 129, at 94.
135. Maria L. La Ganga, FundraisersVow to Keep Kerry in FinancialRace, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2004, at AIO. See also Carl M. Cannon, Flexing Internet Muscles, NAT'L J., Oct. 8, 2004 (revealing that
Kerry raised $65 million online in the first six months of 2004, which "stunned" his fundraisers).
136.

at A16.
137.

Doyle McManus, Kern, Campaign Isn't Banking on a 'Bounce', L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2004,

See Justice, supra note 97.

138.
Patrick Healy, Kerry Shows a Flairfor Raising Money; Senator's Camp Amasses $175M,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 2004, at A6.
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relatively modest donations. Not only will more money from individuals in
amounts not sufficient to "buy" political favors reduce the power of special
interest money, but a political system with broad grassroots participation by
citizens of all income levels may also have independent value, a
justification to which we turn now.
B.

DEMOCRATIZING CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Concerns about the lack of political equality have driven many reform
efforts, including those imposing expenditure limitations and incorporating
an element of public financing. 139 However, because the Supreme Court
has been unwilling to accept equality concerns as justification for
regulations that "level down" or reduce the ability of the wealthy to spend
money in the political realm, the interest is seldom framed in a
straightforward way. In campaign finance jurisprudence, one of its
incarnations appears in cases upholding regulations aimed at corporations,
which have long been the target of campaign finance reform. In Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld segregated fund
requirements imposed on corporate spending in candidate campaigns as a
way to combat "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas."' 14 0 The Court denied that this was an equality
consideration, arguing instead that "the unique state-conferred corporate
structure... facilitates the amassing of large treasuries... [which can]
unfairly influence elections."1 4 1 Although the rationale is tied to the ability
of corporations to accumulate wealth using state-granted privileges, it has
been applied to nonprofit corporations (except ideological nonprofits
views of their
whose resources accurately reflect the political
142) and to unincorporated labor unions. 143
contributors
139. For an articulation of the necessity of political equality in the campaign finance arena, see
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, The
Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19, 21 ("It is another premise of
democracy that citizens must be able, as individuals, to participate on equal terms in both formal
politics and in the informal cultural life that creates the moral environment of the community.").
140. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
141. Id.
142. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
143. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003).
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It is not our project to argue whether the Austin rationale is really an
equality concern in sheep's clothing.'" Instead, this strand of
jurisprudence, which taps into reformers' special concern about corporate
influence over politicians, is relevant to our project in two ways. First, it
suggests that the nature of the supply of political money can be
problematic: if too much of the funding for campaigns comes from
corporate or other wealthy special interests, then the political debate is
distorted in a way that undermines electoral integrity. Currently, finance
laws try to address this distortion by restricting the amount of money that
corporations can contribute or spend and by channeling it through
segregated funds. But another way to eliminate the distortion is to increase
the supply of other money-leveling up rather than (or in addition to)
leveling down. In that way, corporations can continue to "speak" through
their contributions, but their voices will be heard in the context of the
myriad other voices encouraged to speak through, for example, a tax credit
for their political donations.
Public financing, such as the systems adopted in a few states largely
through Clean Elections Laws, 145 works to level up in order to combat any
distortion caused by the greater ability of wealthy interests to contribute to
campaigns. Under these plans, the state uses taxpayer money to provide
funding for qualifying candidates and usually requires candidates who
accept public money to abide by expenditure limits. 146 As Richard Briffault
has observed, public financing aims both to increase the resources available
for campaigns and the electoral debate they generate and to change the
144. Others have argued that the Austin corruption rationale is just such a disguised equality
concern. See BeVier, supra note 61, at 1270-73; Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin
and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 108-11; Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless
Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 412
(1992). But see Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 133, 154-75 (1998) (contesting
this reading of Austin).
145. For example, Maine and Arizona recently adopted statewide public financing programs and
held elections under the system in 2000 and 2002. For an assessment, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF Two STATES THAT OFFER PUBLIC FUNDING

FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES (May 2003). Some cities also provide public financing for qualifying
candidates. See, e.g., PAUL RYAN, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, POLITICAL REFORM THAT
WORKS: PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN TUCSON (2003), available at httpe:www.cgs.org/
publications/docs/PoliticalReformThatWorks.pdf. See generally MARY M. JANICKI, CONNECTICUT
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH REPORT: PUBLIC FINANCING UPDATE (1999) (surveying programs
of twenty-three states), at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/rpt/olr/htm/99-r- I 102.htm.
146. For a summary of public financing programs, see ELIZABETH DANIEL, SUBSIDIZING
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: THE VARIETIES AND VALUES OF PUBLIC FINANCING (Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
Campaign Finance Reform Series Paper, 2000).
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nature of this supply of money. 147 These reforms are promising, and the
advantage of a decentralized federal system is that states can experiment
with various reforms, and other states and the federal government can learn
from their experience. But it is our view that large-scale public financing of
federal elections is unlikely to be adopted in the near (or even relatively
distant) future.
The element of public financing in the current system, the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund, is under severe pressure and at the brink of
insolvency because of low public support. The state efforts themselves are
vulnerable: lawmakers in Massachusetts refused to fund and then repealed
that state's Clean Elections Law imposed on them through an initiative, and
public financing in other states is under attack by opponents who label
them as tax giveaways to politicians. 148 Of course, if we are wrong, and
public financing along the lines of the state systems has a future at the
federal level, it can be accompanied by a tax credit such as the one we
propose. Many public financing systems envision that some of the money
to fund campaigns will come from individual donations as well as tax
money, so they are compatible149with provisions such as a tax credit that
encourages such contributions.
One problem with current public funding regimes is that governments
direct the money to candidates who qualify for public money by collecting
signatures on a petition, receiving a certain amount of small donations, or
performing well in past elections, all indicators that signal some element of
public support to justify taxpayer support. 150 The Presidential Election
Campaign Fund similarly collects money from taxpayers and then parcels
the money out mainly to the candidates and conventions of major parties
and very occasionally to popular minor parties. A more promising design
147.

Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 565,

578 (1999).
148. In Massachusetts, state legislators first resisted and finally repealed a Clean Election Law
passed by initiative. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 2004
SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 25 (2004). The Arizona law faced a potential
repeal threat through the initiative process in 2004. Advocates of repealing the law, which was also
passed as an initiative, called their effort the "No Taxpayer Money for Politicians Act." See Secretary of
State, Jan Brewer, State of Arizona, 2004 General Election, Ballot Measures: Unofficial, at
(last updated Aug. 16, 2004)
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/Generallballotmeasures.htm
(presenting the text of Ballot Measure No. 106, which was not subsequently included on the state's
November 2004 election ballot).
149. The Arizona Clean Elections Law allows a tax credit for up to $500 in contributions to the
nonpartisan fund that distributes funds to qualifying candidates, providing another twist on how tax
provisions might interact with a larger system of public financing. See infra text accompanying notes
201-207.
150.

See DANIEL, supra note 146, at 9.
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of public financing would empower citizens to direct money to candidates
of their choice, including independent candidates and those of minor parties
appearing on the ballot, rather than through the government as
intermediary. Such an approach is more consistent with other successful
methods of distributing public money, such as the charitable deduction in
the tax code.
Other scholars have proposed voucher systems as ways to level up in a
relatively decentralized fashion. A form of public financing, campaign
voucher programs would provide citizens with money that could be used
only to contribute to political campaigns or to fund electoral speech.1 51 Our
proposal shares with these its decentralized nature, but it has the advantage
of using a familiar tool-a tax credit, like those already available, a few of
which are also refundable, and similar to the successful charitable
deduction.152 In essence, a refundable tax credit provides lower- and
middle-income Americans with an additional $100 a year to use for
political donations. Familiarity not only makes enactment more likely, but
it also helps ensure that the credit will be used by voters and will be
"marketed" by candidates and political interests.
The second way in which the Austin rationale is relevant to our
analysis is that it has led the Court to identify a new state interest in
campaign finance regulation: democratizing the political process and
broadening political participation past the few who contribute now. In
recent campaign finance opinions, Justice Breyer has articulated a state
interest in democratizing political participation that he ties to his vision of
the democracy established by the Constitution. This vision of democracy
and how it can inform campaign finance is apparent in Breyer's
concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. "[B]y limiting
the size of the largest contributions," he wrote,
such restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may
bring to bear upon the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to build
public confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate's
151. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for
Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1996); Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM.
PROSPECT, Mar. 1993, at 71. Ackerman's proposal is now part of a larger program that couples
vouchers with requirements of anonymity with respect to campaign contributions. See ACKERMAN &
AYRES, supra note 21. The PIRG proposal for a tax credit is actually only an interim step to the
organization's preferred reform: public financing through a voucher system. Cmar, supra note 18, at 50.
152. Edward Foley's proposal also used the tax system, although he proposed a relatively
complicated formula borrowed from education financing proposals. See Foley, supra note 151, at 1233-
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and
meaningful financial support, encouraging the public participation
53
open discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes. 1
Breyer locates the state interest in democratizing the political process
in the First Amendment, which he interprets to promote participation by
ordinary Americans in campaigns and elections. In his Madison Lecture, he
argues that the First Amendment is a "necessary part of a constitutional
system designed to sustain.., democratic self-government"1 54 and that
campaign finance regulations should be approached with a focus on
"participatory self-government." 155 In his recent Tanner Lectures on
Human Values, entitled Our Democratic Constitution, Breyer makes a
more sustained argument that the Framers conceived of the democratic
system they were constructing as one that encouraged, protected and relied
'1 56
on "active liberty" or the "principle of participatory self-government."
Breyer applies this democratic principle to campaign finance regulation,
describing the "vast disparity in [citizens'] ability to make a campaign
contribution" as one of the main causes of the campaign finance system's
problems. 15 7 He argues that we should "understand the [First] Amendment
as seeking to facilitate a conversation among ordinary citizens that will
encourage their informed participation in the electoral process. ...

[T]he

to participation
Amendment helps to maintain a form of government open
' 158
(in Constant's words) 'by all citizens without exception."'
The primary majority opinion in McConnell, which Breyer joined,
appears to move toward accepting the participatory democracy value as one
that can animate permissible campaign finance regulation. Richard Hasen
argues that the McConnell Court's resurrection of Austin signals that it
accepts as a state interest sufficient to justify campaign finance regulation
the goal of democratizing the process to restore its integrity.
The only (arguably) legitimate reason that a corporation or union should
be barred from spending money on election-related speech
disproportionate to the support for its ideas in society is because this
would give its views disproportionate weight in society, and the
153. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation
omitted). See also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the
End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1754-56 (2001) (discussing the above passage and
its emphasis on democratization).
154. Madison Lecture, supra note 16, at 253.
155. Id. at 254.
156. Tanner Lecture, supra note 16, at 4-5.
157. Id. at 10. See also id. at 11 (citing figures about who gave soft money to political campaigns).
158. Id. at 12 (quoting French philosopher Benjamin Constant).
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legislature is seeking to democratize
the influence that money can bring
159
to bear on the electoral process.

Hasen and others argue that McConnell is a step along a path that is
bringing the Court closer to an explicit endorsement of democratization and
participatory government as a legitimate state interest that can support
campaign finance restrictions and perhaps other regulation of the political
process. 160 The McConnell majority does not argue that the Constitution
compels the Court to promote a vision of democracy as broadly
participatory. Instead, the opinion appears to defer to a congressional
determination that such an interest is normatively attractive, leads to a
better electoral process, and can work to restore the faith of the public in
politics. 16 1 In our view, such a conclusion is an eminently reasonable one
for the legislative branch to reach and to instantiate through various
reforms.
Legislators have agreed that expanding participation is an important
goal in reform efforts. In the 1970s, the interest in broadening participation
in the electoral process provided part of the rationale for the public funding
component of the presidential system. 162 The primary reason that the
government matches only the first $250 of a contribution by an individual
is to encourage candidates to focus on smaller donations by making them
worth more. 163 Expanding participation and thereby increasing the amount
of money available for political campaigns was certainly part of the
motivation behind some of BCRA's design. Supporters believed that "what
may be most needed for the financial health of American politics is to
164
expand the donor base beyond the small pool of those who now give."
Not only would more widespread participation through modest
159. Hasen, supranote 123, at 58. •
160. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformationof Campaign Finance
Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 174 (2004) (arguing that after McConnell "the Court could take into account
the potential for appropriate spending limits to promote public participation and advance democratic
values."); Ortiz, supra note 1,at 303 (noting that the Buckley opinion emphasizes participatory rather
than speech concerns).
161.
Justice Breyer also argues for "judicial modesty" in applying the democratic principles he
discusses. See Tanner Lecture, supra note 16, at 13.
162. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam) (providing rationales).
163. See McCain, supra note 7, at 120.
164. See Malbin, supra note 32, at 182. See also HERBERT ALEXANDER, TAX INCENTIVES FOR
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS? 7-8 (1961) (arguing that broadening the base would "serve as a
manifestation of citizen participation and as a means of defraying high campaign costs while obviating
the need for large contributions"); McCain, supra note 7, at 115, 120 (describing motivations for BCRA
and identifying broader political participation as a goal of further reform); E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Better
Campaign Finance System, WASH. POST, June 4, 2004, at A23 ("The hope of McCain-Feingold was to
create a more broadly based political money system-more people contributing in smaller amounts.").
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contributions help dilute the corruption of a system seen as dominated by
wealthy interests and large contributions, but drafters hoped it also would
restore voters' confidence in the integrity of the system.
The data support the view that public participation in elections is
anemic and not sufficiently well-distributed throughout the population. As
we have seen, only 10% of Americans make political contributions, and
income is a major determinant of whether a citizen will donate. Although
difficult to estimate precisely, about 44% of donors have incomes greater
than $100,000.165 Even if most of these expenditures are not intended to
buy influence but are more like consumption expenditures, as the empirical
analysis suggests, a system where political participation is skewed so
dramatically according to wealth is not a system that appears committed to
notions of egalitarianism or participatory democracy. It is, not surprisingly,
a system where more than three-quarters of the population believe that the
government looks out only for a few well-heeled interests and where nearly
two-thirds believe that our elected officials do not care what citizens
66
think. 1
Whether a democracy characterized by the active participation of
many of its citizens in political campaigns is normatively appealing is
certainly contested, 1 67 and it is not the main engine of reform efforts that
derive their energy from concerns about corruption by special interests. But
we share the view of the drafters of BCRA, Justice Breyer, and other
reformers' 68 that a political system where more people of various
backgrounds participate in ways other than voting is one that is more likely
to win the support of the governed. 169 Such a system will be seen as likely
165.
166.

See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
See Gary Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY

PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT 77, 80-82 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997).

167. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note I, at 303 (noting that distinctions between the value of different
types of participation are controversial); Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission: Ideology Trumps Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 350 (2004) ("[W]e are told
it is inherently better if a campaign has many small donors rather than a few large ones-that is to say,
if the campaign is funded like George Wallace's, rather than Teddy Roosevelt's."). See also John
Mueller, Democracy and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery: Elections, Equality, and the Minimal Human

Being, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 983 (1992) (arguing that minimal participation is required for democracy to
function effectively but also noting that participation other than voting may be more valuable to ensure
that democratic institutions are responsive).
168. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 164, at 7; Norman J. Ornstein, Forewordto ROSENBERG,
supra note 18, at vii ("A healthy democracy works best when lots of people contribute to campaigns,
even if the amounts they give are small.").
169. The objective of expanding participation in governance is related to egalitarian concerns but
does not map onto them precisely. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof
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to serve the interests of many, rather than those of a few, and the integrity
of the electoral system and the government it puts in place is likely to be
greater. A recent report by the American Political Science Association's
Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy underscores the need
to pay close attention to this reform objective. The report documents a
growing worry among Americans about "disparities of participation, voice,
and government responsiveness," and it argues that this concern is fully
justified because there are indeed "disturbing inequalities" in political
participation and influence.1 70 Attitudes and perceptions may be difficult to
change even when the reality of the system changes; 171 after all, the data
presented in Part I demonstrate that the federal campaign system is
dominated by individuals, not special interests, but the rhetoric of reform
still includes the argument that corporate and other well-heeled interests
wield excessive influence over votes and elections. But the first step to
changing perceptions and decreasing voter alienation is altering the
underlying dynamics of the system. Moreover, to the extent that public
opinion data reveal that people with lower socioeconomic status are more
likely to view the political system as corrupt,1 72 reform designed
particularly to empower them may have more effect than less targeted
reforms.
The goal of participatory self-government is served by reform along
the lines of the tax credit we propose in Part IV that encourages ordinary
Americans to donate to political campaigns and to become more involved
in elections and governance. Before we turn to our proposal, we will locate
our analysis in the context of current federal campaign finance regulation,
providing details on aspects that we have not previously discussed.
IlI. THE CURRENT FEDERAL SYSTEM OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION
The federal campaign system regulates primarily through a series of
contribution limits and disclosure provisions, with more stringent
regulations traditionally applied to corporations. The federal laws have
been shaped by the constitutional jurisprudence. The Court has applied less
rigorous scrutiny to contribution limits than to expenditure limits and has
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 150-51 (2004) (describing the differences between the
participation rationale and egalitarian concerns).
170. AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 90, at 5.
171. See Persily & Lammie, supra note 126 (suggesting that views of corruption have little to do
with the reality of the campaign finance regime).
172. Id. at 153-55.
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accepted more stringent regulation of corporate speech, except when the
corporation is a nonprofit ideological one with certain characteristics that
assure its treasury reflects the support of its contributors for its political
causes. With passage of BCRA, soft money-money not subject to some
federal contribution limit-is entirely unavailable to political parties, which
raised hundreds of millions of dollars in soft money in recent elections.
Political parties are also limited in what they can contribute to their
candidates directly and how much they can spend in coordination with their
candidates, although they can make unrestricted expenditures that are
completely independent of candidates' campaigns. 17 3 All the money spent
by parties-whether as contributions or independent expenditures-is now
hard money, that is, money subject to contribution limits, such as the limit
of $25,000 on contributions to political parties by individuals.
Much corporate, union, and other organizational political spending is
channeled through PACs. BCRA expanded this segregated fund
requirement to include expenditures for electioneering communication,
which are broadcast ads that mention a candidate for federal office, are
aired shortly before an election, and are targeted to voters where the
election is being held. Although individuals and unincorporated entities can
spend unlimited amounts of money for electioneering communication, they
are subject to stringent disclosure requirements once they have spent or
contracted to spend more than $10,000. These new disclosure requirements
apply in addition to various other disclosure obligations with respect to
campaign contributions from and expenditures by individuals, candidates,
parties, and PACs.
The only element of public financing in the federal scheme is found in
the presidential election system. 174 Importantly, presidential candidates are
subject to the same contribution restraints and other regulation as any other
federal candidate. In addition, however, FECA set up a Presidential
Election Campaign Fund that receives money from a $3 check-off on
federal tax returns. 175 The tax check-off increased by $2 in 1994 but is not
indexed for inflation. Part of the money helps pay for the nominating
173.

See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 604-05 (1996). See also

Thomas B. Edsall, An "Independent" Spending Blitz; Democrats to Use Novel Approach to Finance

Advertising, WASH. POST, July 30, 2004, at Al (discussing the Democratic Party's use of independent
spending in the 2004 presidential campaign).
174. For discussion of BCRA's application to the presidential system, see John C. Green &
Anthony Corrado, The Impact of BCRA on Presidential Campaign Finance, in LIFE AFTER REFORM:
WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS

2003).
175.

175, 175-76 (Michael J. Malbin ed.,

Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, I.R.C. § 9006(a) (2000).
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conventions of the major parties and of some minor parties. 17 6 In 2004,
each major party received $15 million for its convention. 177 In addition, the
Fund provides money during the primary stage of the election (before the
party's convention) and the general election campaign (between the
convention and the November election) to major party candidates who
agree to abide by expenditure limitations.' 78 Sometimes, minor party
candidates are also eligible for public money, depending on how their
candidates did in past elections (when they received no federal funds).' 79
Most of the money goes to major party candidates, however, so we will
focus on the rules that apply to them.
During the primary season, eligible major party candidates (those who
have raised at least $5000 in contributions of $250 or less in at least twenty
states1 80 ) are eligible for matching public funds.' 8 ' The first $250
contributed by an individual donor to an eligible candidate is matched with
public money on a dollar-by-dollar basis. 18 2 The amount of the federal
match was not raised when BCRA raised the contribution limit for
individuals from $1000 to $2000 (indexed for inflation), thus the relative
importance of federal money has declined. Money contributed by PACs is
not matched. A candidate wanting to receive federal matching funds must
agree to abide by limitations applied to aggregate and state-by-state
expenditures.' 83 In 2004, the aggregate expenditure limit per candidate for
84
the primary season was $37.31 million.'
One sign of the presidential system's distress is the growing number
of candidates declining to participate before the conventions. In 2000, only
President Bush opted out, but in 2004 several candidates with a realistic
shot of winning the nomination declined public financing in the primaries.
The two Democratic candidates who did not take matching funds, Dean
176.
177.
Raise Big
178.
179.

Id. § 9008(b)-(c).
Julia Malone, Election 2004: Parties Benefit from Pary-Goers; Private Convention Fetes
Money, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 20, 2004, at A4.
See CANTOR, supra note 43, at CRS-21.
In 2000, the Reform Party candidate was eligible for $12.6 million in federal funds because
of Ross Perot's strong showing in 1992 and 1996. SCorr THOMAS, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
PUBLIC FUNDING PROGRAM-A COMMISSIONER'S PERSPECTIVE 3 n.4 (2003), available at

http://www.fec.gov.members/thomas/thomasarticle08.pdf.
180. I.R.C. § 9033(b)(3).
181. Id. § 9034(a).
182.

Id.

183. Id. § 9034(b).
184. Federal Election Commission, 2004 Presidential Spending Limits, FEC.GOV, at
http:/lwww.fec.govlpageslbrochures/pubfundlimits_2004.shtml
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter 2004 PresidentialSpending].
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and Kerry, made this choice not only because they wanted to exceed the
aggregate level on expenditures, thereby allowing them the possibility of
matching the spending of President Bush who again opted out of the
system for the primaries. They also wanted to spend substantially more
money in the early primary and caucus states than the state-by-state limits
would allow in attempts to lock in the nomination early and concentrate on
the Republican opponent. Among the problems of the presidential system is
that spending limits are not indexed to the costs of campaigns, which have
risen more than inflation, and the limits do not take account of the current
practice of front-loading primaries and caucuses.18 5 The limits in early
primary and caucus states were especially low; for example, the limit 86
for
expenditures in New Hampshire was $746,200 and $1,343,757 in Iowa.1
The presidential system provides complete public funding for the
major party nominees in the general election period. A nominee who
accepts public money is limited to spending only that amount and cannot
spend any privately raised money. In 2004, the expenditure limit (and
therefore the amount of the public grant) was $74.62 million.' 8 7 During the
general election part of the presidential campaign, individuals, PACs, and
parties can spend their own funds independently, subject to campaign
finance laws, and the national party committees can spend a limited amount
of money in coordinated expenditures. In 2004, the amount of coordinated
expenditures permitted to the parties during the general election period was
$16,249,699.188
It became apparent in 2004 that the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund must be substantially overhauled. Three major candidates opted out
of it for the primary period. The match provided during the primaries,
which has not been changed since the system was enacted in 1974, became
substantially less attractive when most of the contribution limits were
raised and indexed by BCRA. Although the spending limits are indexed for
inflation, they have not kept pace with the rising costs of campaigns and
the state-by-state limits are unrealistic in a world of front-loaded primaries.
The most significant signal of a system in trouble, however, is the financial
viability of the Fund itself. Under the law, the Fund has to set aside
sufficient funds for the conventions and the money due major candidates in
the general election period, and that has meant that the Fund has come up
185.

See Green & Corrado, supra note 174, at 181-82.

186.
2004 PresidentialSpending, supra note 184.
187.
Id.
188.
Federal Election Commission, 2004 CoordinatedParty Expenditure Limits, RECORD, Mar.
2004, at 15, available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2004/mar04.pdf.
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short with respect to its obligations during the primaries. The government
was able to pay the matching funds throughout 2004 as the money flowed
in from the check-off, and it was helped by the decision of major
candidates not to take any money during the primaries. But it is clear that
absent substantial reform, or an unlikely jump in participation by taxpayers
in the check-off program (participation rates have dropped from 28.7% in
1980 to 11.3% in 2002), the Fund will soon be insolvent, perhaps as early
as the next election, and unable to meet its legal obligations even in a tardy
fashion.
Thus, reform is necessary in the short term, and reform must include
changes that increase participation by taxpayers in the system. Over time,
fewer taxpayers have contributed to the Fund for several reasons:18 9 fewer
taxpayers have been eligible as fewer people have had any tax liability
because of tax cuts passed by Congress, and fewer of the remaining eligible
taxpayers have chosen to participate. 190 Some argue that the decline is
partly due to the increased use of computer software to prepare taxes; such
software typically provides a default of no contribution and requires an
affirmative decision by taxpayers to make the $3 available. 19 1 In addition,
many taxpayers may mistakenly believe that the check-off program
increases their liability rather than merely diverting part of their taxes into
the Presidential Campaign Election Fund.
Although there is no federal tax credit for political contributions
currently in effect, the tax code did include such a subsidy from 1972 until
1986. From 1972 to 1974, taxpayers could claim either a 50%
nonrefundable tax credit up to $12.50 ($25 for joint filers) or a full
192
deduction of up to $50 ($100 for joint filers) on political contributions.
From 1975 to 1978, the amounts were raised to a 50% tax credit up to $25
($50 for joint filers) or a full deduction of up to $100 ($200 for joint
filers). 193 In 1979, the tax credit was increased to 50% of $50 ($100 for
joint filers), but the deduction option was eliminated. 194 The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 repealed the tax credit as part of its overall goal of base
broadening. 195 Although proposals to reinstate the tax credit are
189.
See PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS, supra note 9, at 51 tbls.4.2, 4.3.
190.
See Green & Corrado, supra note 174, at 182.
191.
See PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS, supra note 9, at 57.
192.
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 560-62 (1971).
193.
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
194.
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2778 (1978).
195.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2108 (1986). For a discussion
of the legislative history of the repeal in 1986, see Cmar, supra note 18, at 14-18.
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periodically introduced in Congress, 196 they have not received serious
attention.
Campaign reform through the tax code is more popular on the state
level, although it is not part of the campaign regime of the vast majority of
states. Only six states-Arkansas, Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, and
97
Virginia-currently offer a form of tax benefit for political contributions.'
Minnesota, which has the most generous program, offers a full refund of up
to $50 per person for individual contributions to state and local candidates
and political parties. 198 The refund system actually works outside of the
income tax system; contributors send a Political Contribution Refund
("PCR") receipt to government, and they receive a refund for their
contributions one to two months later. 19 9 In addition, Minnesota taxpayers
can participate in a state tax check-off of $5 which does not increase their
tax liability. 20 0 Money from the tax check-off program goes to20 political
1
parties and candidates who abide by voluntary expenditure limits.
Oregon has the oldest state tax program still in effect, and it offers a
100% tax credit up to $50 ($100 for couples) for contributions to state and
local candidates, political parties, and PACs. 20 2 The tax credit is
nonrefundable and any excess over tax liability cannot be carried forward
to future tax years. 20 3 Ohio and Arkansas also provide a 100% tax credit for
up to $50 per taxpayer per year; 20 4 Virginia's system, enacted in 2000, is
less generous, providing a 50% tax credit up to $25 per individual.20 5
Arizona's tax credit is part of the Clean Elections Law adopted by ballot
initiative and provides a 100% tax credit up to $500 for donations made to
196. In the 108th Congress, for example, Senators Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and John Warner (RVA) proposed a nonrefundable tax credit for political contributions up to $200 per taxpayer and

targeted it to individuals with incomes of $60,000 or less, or couples with incomes of $120,000 or less.
See An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Allow a Nonrefundable Tax Credit for
Contributions to Congressional Candidates, S. 804, 108th Cong. (2003).
197.
ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 22 tbl.AI-1.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 35-36.
200. Id. at 35.
201. id. at 35-37.
202. Oregon Department of Revenue, Political Contributions Tax Credit, OREGON.GOV, at
http://egov.oregon.gov/DOR/PERTAX/IC-101-662.shtml (last revised Dec. 21, 2004).
203. Id.
204. Ohio's tax credit was adopted in 1995, Arkansas's in 1996. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 22
tbl.Al-1.
205. Id. at 22 tbl.A 1-1.
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the nonpartisan Clean Elections Fund.2 °6 Some of these states (Minnesota,
20 7
Ohio, Arizona, and Virginia) also have tax check-offs of various sizes.
We will discuss some of these state tax credit programs as we detail
the design of our federal proposal and assess its likely impact on
participation. The point we hope to make here is merely that a tax credit is
not a fanciful proposal, although it is not one widely embraced at the state
level, nor is it part of the current federal landscape. Yet the time is ripe,
particularly with respect to the broken presidential campaign financing
system, to seriously consider new approaches to regulation.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL: USING THE TAX SYSTEM
The bedrock of our current campaign finance system has been to
minimize or even eliminate special interest money from the political
equation through limits on contributions, segregated fund requirements,
and disclosure. Legislation erects a dam to keep the special interest money
out, but the dam constantly leaks. An alternative strategy, and an approach
that is not inconsistent with also working to plug the leaks in the dam, is to
drown out the special interest money with more contributions of modest
size by individuals. Here, we propose reform aimed at empowering
Americans to more fully participate in politics.
Our proposal is to enact an annual $100 ($200 for joint filers)
refundable tax credit to taxpayers who make contributions directly to
federal candidates or national political parties. 20 9 A refundable credit would
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 23 tbl.Al-l. For a detailed description of the state programs, see id. at 24-64; Cmar,

supra note 18, at 21-34.
Unlike the PIRG proposal, see Cmar, supra note 18, at 51-52, we would allow the tax credit
209.
to be taken by taxpayers even if they contribute more than $100 to candidates and parties. We do not
share PIRG's view that all contributions should be kept at very low amounts; instead, we aim to
encourage participation by people who have not previously contributed to campaigns by denying the
credit to those with incomes over a certain level. In our view, the problem is not that the current
contribution limitations are too low; rather, the problem is that not enough people participate in the
system though donations of varying amounts, including modest donations. We expect, however, that
most taxpayers who claim the credit would not be likely to contribute more than the tax credit, so the
differences in the effect of the two proposals would likely be small. Eligible candidates and parties will
be determined using existing FECA definitions and state ballot access laws; previous federal tax credits
included provisions relying on those sources that worked adequately to identify qualifying recipients for
tax-credit-eligible political contributions. See infra text accompanying notes 278-280.
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allow all eligible taxpayers to benefit fully from the tax provision; even
people with no tax liability would receive a payment equal to the allowable
credit. Political contributions made through the tax reporting date (April 15
of the following year) would qualify for the credit, just as the tax system
currently permits with respect to contributions to Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs). The tax credit would be available for individuals with
AGIs less than $100,000 ($200,000 for joint filers). 2 10 This is roughly the
cut-off point for the top 2% of 2001 AGI in the United States for individual
filers, and the top 4% of 2001 AGI for joint filers. That is, about 96.7% of
taxpayers would be eligible for a tax credit under our proposal. 211 In order
to receive the tax credit, filers would need to provide the same type of
documentation currently required to take advantage of the tax deduction for
charitable contributions, such as a cancelled check or a receipt from the
campaign.
Ours is a straightforward proposal, and we believe that its simplicity is
its strength. It does not require a massive revision of current tax code. It
does not require establishing a new administrative agency to administer it.
Unlike the much discussed Ackerman and Ayres proposal in Voting with
210. We do not phase the tax credit out, but rather deny the benefit entirely to any taxpayer with
over $100,000 in AGI ($200,000 for joint filers). Phase-outs of tax benefits add substantially to the
complexity of the provision and the tax code. Our goal is to confine the benefit to lower- and middleincome Americans and not provide a subsidy to those in income groups that need no additional
incentive to contribute. Thus, we favor the simpler approach that concentrates the benefit on a particular
group of people. A phase-out also has a second disadvantage: donors would be uncertain of the amount
of their credit until after they completed their tax forms. A phase-out based on the amount of AGI, for
example, would require that donors know the level of their AGIs before they donate in order to
calculate the effect of the tax credit. This type of uncertainty will cause people on the margin, who are
uncertain about their AGI, not to give because of the risk involved. This will likely, in turn, make
mobilization efforts by parties more difficult. It is important to note that our income distribution
information differs substantially from that of other authors, such as Overton, supra note 18, at 76 &
n.12, and the U.S. PIRG Education Fund, supra note 43, at 62 n.12. These authors rely on data derived
from the Census. The Census measures household income rather than taxable income. Moreover, the
Census relies on a combination of data from the Current Population Survey ("CPS") of March 2001,
and other sources, including the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), the Food and Nutrition Service, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Health Care Financing Administration. See, e.g., CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT,
IN
INCOME

ROBERT W. CLEVELAND & MARC J. ROEMER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY
at
(2001),
available
at
3
STATES:
2000,
THE
UNITED

http://www.census.gov/prod/200lpubs/p60-213.pdf. While this is a good measure to identify the
income of citizens, projecting the distributional effect of a tax credit proposal requires data on taxable
income in the United States. Thus, we rely on IRS documentation of the number of tax forms filed and
the income reported on these forms. We also calculate participation rates based on individual (or per
capita) taxable income rather than household income. See infra note 262.
211. See Internal Revenue Service, 2001 Individual Income Tax, All Returns: Adjusted Gross
Income, Exemptions, Deductions, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income and by Marital
Status, IRS.GOV, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/0linl2ms.xls (last visited Feb. 17, 2005)
[hereinafter 2001 Individual Income Tax].
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Dollars,our proposal does not require the creation of "patriot dollars," 2 12 a
catchy name for a mechanism that voters and politicians will be entirely
unfamiliar with; our proposal does not entail adopting a counterintuitive
and perhaps counterproductive framework of anonymity for political
contributions; 2 13 and our proposal will not depend on a centralized voucher
system and other substantial bureaucratic apparatus. 214 The tax credit does
not necessitate a gargantuan tracking and documentation effort. It does not
require much strategic thinking on the part of taxpayers or political
operatives hoping to encourage its use, nor does it call for a substantial
time commitment from taxpayers wanting to participate. Rather, our
proposal merely adds a line item on the current federal tax form to
encourage the democratic process in the United States. Our proposal is thus
extraordinarily easy to implement.
The goals of the proposal are multi-fold. First, such a proposal is
designed to increase money from individuals in politics-to provide them
enhanced power to pay for politics-thereby further marginalizing special
interest money. Second, our tax credit addresses concerns sounded by
Justice Breyer and others about the need to revitalize participatory
democracy. The proposal will increase involvement in politics by those
who do not traditionally participate and who may be underrepresented in
the political process. Third, the proposal is designed to be a part of any
reform of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund, although it has broader
application to congressional campaigns as well. Significant change in the
presidential public funding system is imminent, and including a tax credit
for political donations as part of the overhaul will help to maintain the
primary role for individual voter influence. Fourth, our proposal allows for
the public funding of campaigns (often supported by Democrats), but
allows market mechanisms to allocate the funding (often supported by
Republicans). It thus can attract a bipartisan group of supporters and is
212. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 66-92.
213. See Garrett, supra note 124, at 1036-39 (arguing that anonymity would reduce voter
competence).
214. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 111-39 (describing rules necessary to avoid
evasion and to enforce the system). Although we find the Ackerman and Ayres proposal theoretically
intriguing, we find it too unwieldy and complicated to be considered a reform proposal likely to be
adopted by states or the federal government. We also doubt the political viability of any federal voucher
system, although with more experience with vouchers in some states, it is possible that such a reform
would be seriously considered by members of Congress, but only in the relatively distant future. Thus,
we are not convinced that PIRG's call for a federal voucher system, with a tax credit as only an
intermediate step, is politically feasible. See Cmar, supra note 18, at 35-41. Moreover, to the extent that
the two proposals are coupled in reform proposals, the unrealistic voucher proposal may reduce the
likelihood of enactment of the more familiar and popular tax credit.
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likely to gain consensus approval in Congress. We begin by outlining the
four main advantages, and we offer some data both from the federal tax
credit that existed twenty years ago and from states that have implemented
similar tax credits and contribution refund systems. We then address
potential critiques of our proposal.
A. ACHIEVING THE CORE GOALS
1. Reducing the Influence of Special Interests
The tax credit achieves the first goal of reform in a straightforward
way. A refundable tax credit essentially provides each eligible taxpayer
with 100 extra dollars of income to use for political contributions. By
making it cheaper to give, we provide a powerful incentive for individuals
to give more. With more individuals giving, special interest money
becomes even less important on the margin than it is now. Special interests
already give a minority of the funds of politics, and this proposal further
reduces the amount of this potentially corruptive money. It helps to even
the playing field by leveling up.
Our underlying assumption is that while the utility of money to the
candidate and the interest group is always increasing, it is increasing at a
decreasing rate. That is, there is decreasing marginal utility to the candidate
and to the interest group of additional money to a campaign, holding all
other factors (such as closeness of the election) constant. If this is true, then
an infusion of individual money to the candidate produces a wealth effect.
Each additional dollar has less marginal utility to the candidate. The
interest group will equate its marginal benefit to its marginal cost of giving.
The infusion of individual money to the candidate will decrease the
marginal benefit to the candidate of the interest group's money. If the
marginal utility of the interest group is tied to the marginal utility of the
candidate, then the interest group will contribute less than previously
because of the lower marginal utility of its money. If the marginal utility of
the interest group remains the same, then interest group giving will not
change. Ultimately, under the assumption of diminishing marginal utility,
individual money will increase substantially and interest group money will
215
decrease or stay the same.
215. There are four other possible assumptions. The first is that the legislator has increasing
marginal utility, while the interest group has diminishing marginal utility. In this case, the legislator
wants to receive more money, but the interest group is unwilling to give it; thus, interest group giving
does not change. The second case is that the interest group has increasing marginal utility, and the
legislator has decreasing marginal utility. In this case, the legislator does not want the interest group to
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There is also a second effect that might be even more powerful than
this wealth effect-substitution to other activities. Interest groups will set
the marginal value of all political activities equal in equilibrium. If giving
money to candidates becomes less attractive, interest groups will direct
their money into other activities where the marginal value is higher, such as
lobbying or grassroots action. Currently, corporations spend substantially
more money on lobbying than on campaign contributions, 2 16 and lobbying
expenditures are regulated only by disclosure provisions, so money can be
easily shifted to this activity. 2 17 The point here is that interest group money
will be moved from campaign finance to alternative activities with higher
marginal value, leaving the campaign field increasingly to individual
donors.
Previous experience suggests that a tax credit such as we propose is
superior to a tax deduction. From 1972 to 1978, the federal government
allowed taxpayers to take a 50% tax credit or a full deduction from income
for political contributions (up to a legislated limit).21 8 There was no income
cap. Between one-third and one-fourth of tax returns that claimed an offset
2 19
for political contributions claimed a deduction annually during this time.
This suggests that 25% of tax returns that claimed an offset for political
contributions were from taxpayers whose tax rate exceeded 50%, indicating
that the deduction was taken by the very rich-precisely the people who
are likely to give to campaigns in the absence of such an incentive. In our
contribute, but the interest group wants to give more and more to the legislator. It is hard to envision
this as accurate with respect to interest group contributions. The legislator can always send
contributions back to the interest group. A third case is that both the interest group and legislator have
increasing marginal utility. If this is the case, then the relative shape of the curves affects the outcome.
Suffice it to say that under these assumptions, there exist conditions under which interest group money
would increase in response to more individual money and interest group money would increase more
(as a percentage) than individual money. We think, however, that this scenario is unlikely. If both the

candidate and the interest group have convex utility curves, we would expect interest groups currently
to represent a larger proportion of campaign contributions than our empirical analysis in Part I reveals.
A final set of assumptions is that campaign giving fits an arms race model; that is, interest groups will

give more as individuals give more. This is an interesting scenario because it suggests that interest
groups are in an arms race with individuals who give. To the extent that an arms race exists, then our
proposal would not dilute the proportion of special interest money, but it also would be unlikely to

increase the proportion. From an economic perspective, we think that the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility of money for candidates and interest groups, holding all else constant, is a reasonable

and common one.
216. Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo & Timothy Groseclose, Corporate PAC Campaign
Contributions in Perspective, 2 Bus. & POL. 75, 83 (2000) (comparing lobbying expenditures and
campaign expenditures of corporations in the 1997-1998 election cycle).
217. See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 705 (1995) (codified at
2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 192-195 (providing details of the tax credit changes).
219.

See CANTOR, supra note 43, at CRS-31.
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view, a tax subsidy is justified when it changes behavior in most cases, not
when it provides a windfall for activity that would take place without the
incentive of the tax provision.
In addition, the nonrefundable nature of the credit meant that only
those with tax liability were able to take advantage of the credit. The tax
credit was also available for only 50% of the contribution; thus, only those
with means to absorb the remaining 50% of the contribution were able to
give. Congress cited these concerns as justification for repealing the
previous tax provision in stages. Congress chose to repeal the deduction
portion of the tax provision in 1978 because it believed that the tax credit,
which could be taken by itemizers and non-itemizers alike, was a better
way to change behavior of taxpayers who would contribute moderate
amounts to politics. 220 Later, during consideration of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, it was determined that the structure of the nonrefundable and
limited tax credit also primarily benefited those who were already likely to
give.22 1 Accordingly, the tax credit was repealed as part of that major
restructuring of the tax code.
Our tax credit proposal solves these problems with the earlier federal
regime. First, we propose only a credit and not a deduction. It is therefore
available to those who itemize and those who do not, and it has the same
value for all eligible taxpayers. It offsets, dollar-for-dollar, contributions up
to $100 for taxpayers who can claim the subsidy. Second, only taxpayers
making less than $100,000 in AGI ($200,000 for joint filers) are eligible. It
is therefore unavailable to taxpayers at highest income levels who are likely
to contribute to political campaigns without the additional incentive of the
tax credit. Third, the credit is refundable, making it accessible and
attractive to those in the middle- and lower-income brackets who may not
have sufficient tax liability to offset a nonrefundable credit. Finally, by
capping the tax credit at $100, we encourage donations of modest size
which work to reduce corruption and the perception of corruption in the
political process. These small contributions are unlikely to be corrosive to
the political process in the way that special interest money is; moreover,
these small contributions are also more costly to bundle to form substantial
contributions in the aggregate.
220. See S. REP. No. 95-1263, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6822; H.R. REP. 951445, at 45-46 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. (95 stat.) 6822, 7084-85.
221.

President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, 25 Stand.

Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 106-07 (extra ed. May 1985) ("The efficacy of the political contribution credit in
producing additional political contributions is open to question. The credit produces no marginal
incentive for taxpayers who without regard to the credit would make contributions of $100 or more. The
credit also creates no incentive for low-income individuals who have no income tax liability.").
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2. Democratizing Political Campaigns
A second advantage is that the tax credit will likely increase
participation in politics by ordinary citizens. To understand the
participation dynamic and its impact, we must consider both the supply
side-citizens-and the demand side-political parties and candidates. By
making it less expensive for individuals to give, people who do not donate
because it is too expensive are more likely to give on the margin. That is,
more people will enter the political process because it has become less
costly to do so. Numerous political science studies have found that one of
the primary determinants of the amount of individual political giving is
income. 222 Put simply, those with more income contribute more to
candidates. Indeed, the Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder study
223
found that individuals give, on average, about 0.045% of their income.
This means that an individual who makes $100,000 annually and chooses
to donate, gives, on average, approximately $45 to political candidates and
parties. The tax credit we propose increases the income of individuals but
only if they use their additional dollars for campaign contributions.
To illustrate the effect, consider a person making $22,000 per year
who might give no more than $10 on average to a political campaign
without our proposal. With our proposal, the income constraint is pushed
out more than ten times, allowing a contribution of $100 without any cost
to the individual. Thus, because of the refundable $100 tax credit, all
individuals who receive the credit will be equivalent in "contributing
power" to those who make roughly $220,000 per year without the credit.2 24
One key aspect to the proposal is that the credit, unlike most tax credits, is
refundable, 225 so poor and middle-income individuals without tax liability
are on equal footing with individuals with greater tax liability, and
therefore have an incentive to participate in campaigns.
222. See NES CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 112, at 55; SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 125-37 (1972); VERBA
ET AL., supra note 112, at ch.7. See also RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO
VOTES? 20-26, 134-35 (1980) (discussing the correlation between income and voting).
223. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 118-19 (noting that .04% of the national income is
contributed to political campaigns and that even the very rich, such as executives at corporations,
contribute .045% of their annual income to political campaigns).
224. The comparison calculation is as follows: 10 x $10 = $100; 10 x $22,000 = $220,000.
225. There are few refundable tax credits in the tax code for individuals. For the two major
refundable credits, see I.R.C. § 31 (2000) (for taxes withheld on wages in excess of taxes due); id. § 32
(2000) (earned income tax credit). Other credits are id. § 33 (2000) (dealing with withholding tax on
U.S. source income of foreign persons primarily with respect to passive investment); id. § 34 (2000)
(credit for some gasoline used on farms); id. § 35 (2000) (limited credit for some health insurance
expenses); id. § 36 (2000) (general credit for tax overpayments).
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Because the rich are more likely to give without any tax subsidy, our
proposal includes income caps to reduce the possibility that the credit will
be a windfall for behavior that would occur anyway and to target the tax
incentive to those who are not currently giving. Of course, the targeted
design is necessarily somewhat overinclusive, encompassing some
taxpayers who are giving now, without additional encouragement. It is
difficult to estimate how much of the tax credit is "wasted" in this sense.
Surveys have shown that 10% of individuals currently give to
campaigns. 22 6 Under our proposal, 3 to 4% of higher-income taxpayers are
ineligible for the tax credit because of the income caps, and many of these
comprise the group currently participating in the campaign finance system.
Conversely, around 6% of those who currently give are eligible for the tax
credit; the benefit to these people is arguably a windfall because the
government will be subsidizing behavior that would occur without any
financial incentive. As long as there is not full crowding out, however, the
tax credit still acts as something of an incentive for these taxpayers in that
it is likely to induce them to give more money to candidates and parties
than they are contributing now. The bottom line, however, is that a subset
of those who give will still be eligible for the tax credit. It is difficult to
design a system that avoids any windfall, but income caps are an effective
and relatively simple mechanism to limit most of the tax benefit to those
who need the incentive to change their behavior. We believe that the added
cost attributable to those who receive a windfall from the tax credit must be
balanced against the need for simplicity in the design of the subsidy.
We want to be careful not to overstate the ability of some lowerincome Americans to take advantage of a refundable tax credit. To receive
money from the government under the proposal, people must contribute
money to a candidate or party, claim the credit on their tax returns on April
15, and then wait for their tax refunds. People with very little income will
not be able to make this sort of "loan" months before they receive any
refund. To deal with this problem, the Minnesota system provides
reimbursement within weeks of the contribution, not only at tax refund
time. Although we acknowledge that the design of a federal refundable tax
credit limits its attractiveness to some in lower-income brackets, we also
firmly believe that a major strength of this proposal is its simplicity and its
226.

See, e.g., NANCY BURNS, DONALD R. KINDER, STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & VIRGINIA SAPIRO,

2000: PRE- AND POST-ELECTION SURVEY (2001) (using
National Election Study data), available at http:/lwww.icpsr.umich.edu; ROSENSTONE & HANSEN,
supra note 88, at 42 (using data from 1952-1990 National Election Studies).
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY,
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use of the established and familiar government system.227 Use of the tax
system eliminates the need to create another federal bureaucracy.
Moreover, those who want to take advantage of the refundable credit but
who cannot wait a long time for their refund can time their political
donations so they are closer to the tax-filing deadline and thereby reduce
228
any delay.
Merely giving people money to contribute through a tax credit is not
the full story. Changes in the ability to give will also change the
mobilization effort undertaken by politicians and political parties. Or to put
it in economic terms, by increasing the supply of political money, those
who have unmet demand will seek the new funds. BCRA's elimination of
soft money has reduced a substantial supply of money to political parties
without reducing their demand in any way; thus, they will try to satisfy
their need for cash by cultivating this new source. One of the main tenets of
the voting literature in political science is that politicians, political parties,
and other institutions mobilize the portions of the electorate that they find
to be most likely to participate, and they create opportunities for political
action that citizens would not otherwise have.2 29 Citizens who are most
likely to participate are those who have social networks, those who are
particularly concerned about a key campaign issue, and those who have
resources (time and money). 230 By putting money in the pockets of lowerand middle-income Americans solely for use in the political process, our
proposal ensures that these groups will become a focus of mobilization
efforts by strategic political actors. 231 Federal candidates and political
227. For example, experience with similar provisions like those for charitable contributions
provides a check against fraud and misuse. Unlike, for example, used cars of uncertain value that are
donated to charity, the dollars that are transferred from individuals to candidates and parties will leave a
much more clean and traceable money trail. Other concerns of fraud on the part of candidates, parties,
or contributors are already ameliorated by the extensive federal regulatory structure for political
campaigns that involved extensive recordkeeping and disclosure, and can be further addressed through
enforcement provisions common in the tax code and election laws.
228. If experience with the refundable credit demonstrates that few lower-income Americans are
taking advantage of it, perhaps because of the liquidity problem, it could be amended to be more
generous for them, perhaps providing to taxpayers below a certain AGI a 200% tax credit. We
appreciate Steve Choi's suggestion here.
229. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 20-37. See also id. at 171 (finding that people
who are contacted by a political party are 52% more likely to contribute money than those not contacted
(an increase from 8.7% to 13.3% in midterm election years)). With reference to absentee balloting, see
VERBA ET AL., supra note 112, at 369-90; J. Eric Oliver, The Effects of Eligibility Restrictions and
PartyActivity on Absentee Voting and Overall Turnout, 40 AM. J. POL. SC. 498 (1996).
230. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 1-70, 128-29.
231. Id. at 172-74 ("Naturally enough, because so many people vote, party mobilization has its
largest effect on the probability that people who are otherwise least likely to turn out-blacks, Puerto
Ricans, Mexican-Americans, the poor, and the least educated-actually will turn out to vote."). There is
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parties hungry for hard money in a world of no soft money will help
publicize and implement a tax credit, a factor crucial to the credit's success.
If the regulatory system affects only the supply of money through
contribution limits but leaves the demand for money unaffected, then those
who need money will work to exploit promising avenues for additional
funds.

23 2

As part of the process of obtaining donations, those organizing
mobilization efforts will educate, inform, and encourage people not already
233
active in campaigns to participate in the American electoral process.
Moreover, mobilization drives are not typically confined to encouraging
only one aspect of participation in the electoral politics. Rather, people who
give also become the focus of other efforts to generate participation, for
example, by discussing politics with neighbors, writing letters, and, most
importantly, voting. 234 Politicians and party leaders understand that
participation in one dimension of a campaign tends to lead to wider
engagement with politics. One political activist noted, "it would be far
better to receive 10,000 one-dollar contributions than one $10,000
contribution, because you'll get 10,000 votes. Anybody who makes a
commitment to a particular candidate, even to give them a dollar, will tend
to want to support that candidate and vote for them . .235 Parties use
"..

overwhelming evidence that party mobilization increases voter turnout. See, e.g., MARJORIE RANDON
HERSHEY & PAUL ALLEN BECK, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 152 (10th ed. 2003); Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Soft Money, HardMoney, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598,

616-17 (2000). Note also that experiments with charitable contribution tax credits in Arizona have
found that charities that mobilize, market, and advertise are most likely to see a boon from a tax credit.
See Carol J. De Vita & Eric C. Twombly, Charitable Tax Credits: Boon or Bust for Nonprofits?,
CHARTING CIV. SoC'Y, July 2004, at 5.

232. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311,
311-12 (making the argument that current jurisprudence restricts the supply of campaign money while
leaving demand unchanged and thus ensures substitution effects).
233. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 36-37. These mobilization campaigns not only
encourage participation in the tax credit system, but also work to improve voter competence to make
electoral choices. This dynamic provides one answer to those who have been concerned that any
increase in participation may come from people who lack the knowledge to make good political
decisions. We also believe that most citizens can participate competently without extensive civic
education because they will be able to use cues or shortcuts to act consistently with their preferences.
For a discussion of voter cues and voter competence, see Elizabeth Garrett, The William J.Brennan
Lecture in Constitutional Law: The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and
Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 675-82 (2002).
234.
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 170-78.
235.
Jim Clarke, Executive Director of the California Clean Money Campaign, made this point

(that has been made by many other politicians) at a Commonwealth Club of San Francisco Speech and
Discussion on July 22, 2003. For a transcript of the discussion, see Answers to Written Questionsfrom
the

Floor, COMMONWEALTHCLUB.ORG,

July

22,

2003,

at

http://www.commonwealthclub.org/

archive/03/03-07asner-qa.html.
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their contribution mailing lists to target get-out-the-vote drives.2 3 6 Thus, it
is not surprising that studies find nearly 70% of people who give money to
candidates also vote. 237 Political giving cascades into a series of other
aspects of citizen participation and voting that are essential to the healthy

functioning of a democratic state.
Experience in the states has taught that there are good reasons to
expect mobilization of voters to occur as a result of a campaign
contribution refund program. As we alluded to earlier, there are differences
among state refund programs. Below is a table of the campaign
contribution refund programs by characteristics:
236.
Cf John Mintz & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Software Digs Deep into Lives of Voters;
Campaigns' "Profiling" Stirs Privacy Worries, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2000, at Al (discussing the
sophisticated use of information by political parties and campaigns). For an example of a company that
assists campaigns in, among other things, using lists of contributors in get-out-the-vote efforts, see
ARISTOTLE, at http://www.aristotle.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). For a discussion of how different
aspects of the mobilization efforts of parties are often correlated, see HERSHEY & BECK, supra note
23 1, at 62-63 (discussing how different aspects of the mobilization efforts of parties are often
correlated); ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 162-69.
237.
See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 88, at 42, 50. This number has been calculated as
follows: Using Table 3-1, we know that between 57% (presidential election years) and 42% (midterm
election years) of people from 1952 to 1990 voted. Taking the midpoint, we assume that 50% of people
vote. Also from Table 3-1, we know that approximately 10% of all people contribute money to parties
or campaigns. From Table 3-4, we know that of all the people who voted or contributed money, 13%
did both. Using Bayes's rule and numerical methods, we can calculate that 6.9% of all people contribute
and vote.
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238
TABLE 1. State campaign contribution refund programs

Contribution
State

Date
Implemented

Cap/
Percent

System

Income.
Cap

Refundable

None

No

Eligible
Contributions

CheckOff

23 9

Credited
Candidates,

$50 ($100) /
Arkansas

1996

Tax Credit

Arizona

1999

Tax Credit

$500/ 100%

Ind.

$50 ($100) /

Minnesota

1992

Ohio

1995

Tax Credit

Oregon

1969

Tax Credit

100%
Tax

Refund

None

No

None

Yes

None

No

None

No

Elections Fund

Yes
Candidates
Yes
and Parties
Candidates

Yes

Candidates,

$50 ($100) /
100%

No

reditClean

100%
Crdt$50 ($100) /
100%

Parties, and
PACs

Parties, and

No

PACs

$25 ($50) /
Virginia

2000

Tax Credit

50%

$100 ($200) I
Our Proposal

Tax Credit

100%

None

No

Yes

Candidates

$100K
($200K)

Candidates

Yes

and Parties

Yes

As Table 1 reveals, there are a number of crucial differences between
the state systems and our proposal. First, our proposal reduces the universe
of eligible taxpayers through income caps, thus eliminating from coverage
the rich who would likely contribute to candidates in any case. It has been
estimated that in Ohio nearly 20% of the cost of the tax credit is
attributable to households with incomes of over $100,000.240 Second, like
only Minnesota's refund program, we provide a fully refundable credit.
This aspect of a public subsidy is important because it empowers people
who have no tax liability to participate in the system. Our proposal,
however, is different from Minnesota's. In Minnesota, individuals must
incur the cost of filling out a separate form and mailing it to the Minnesota
Department of Revenue in order to claim the refund. Our proposal,
however, is a line on a tax form that is completed at tax time. On the other
These data are drawn from ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 22-64.
239. The numbers in parentheses give the contribution or income cap for those filing jointly (or
for two people).
240.
ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 50.
238.
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hand, Minnesotans receive reimbursement soon after they file. Third, our
proposal and the programs of Arkansas and Oregon differ in that our
proposal includes candidates and parties, but it does not include PACs.
Consistent with our goal of diminishing the role of special interests in
politics, our tax credit cannot be used by special interests to fill their
coffers at the taxpayers' expense. Indeed, by explicitly eliminating PACs
from eligibility, we insure that parties and candidates are the beneficiaries
of the individual money.
One concern with our decision to exclude PACs from receiving
donations eligible for the federal tax credit may be that mobilization is then
left only to parties and candidates. 241 Experience in the states demonstrates
that one major factor in the success of refund programs is how aggressively
they are marketed to voters by political parties, candidates, and others. Few
taxpayers will discover the provision on their own, and the IRS's efforts to
publicize the tax subsidy will also have limited effect (although we expect
government education efforts to be more successful than those relating to
the tax check-off because a credit will be more attractive to taxpayers).
Although PACs would be energetic marketers of any tax subsidy, to
include them would be inconsistent with the objective of decreasing the
role of special interests in paying for politics.
Moreover, it is our view that citizen mobilization by candidates and
parties can be sufficiently effective to produce significant behavior change.
Indeed, in Minnesota, where refunds are provided for political
contributions (although not through the tax system), the Minnesota
Republican Party has been successful in educating voters and obtaining
additional contributions as a result of the refund system. 2 4 2 Even if some
241.
PIRG would allow contributions to PACs to qualify for the voucher/tax credit proposal
because PIRG views these organizations as particularly effective at mobilizing voters. See Cmar, supra
note 18, at 42. See also Overton, supra note 18, at 108 (allowing a credit for donations to PACs also).

PIRG's ideological commitment to small donor democracy means that the organization is focused more
on stringently limiting the amount of contributions to all entities, including PACs, than it is on the
problem of special interest influence on the political process and the appearance of such. See, e.g.,

Cmar, supra note 18, at 44-45. This is not the predominant view driving campaign finance reform;
rather, the concern about special interest influence hag been overriding for reformers and courts and is a
substantial cause of voter alienation. Accordingly, we believe the disadvantages of allowing the tax
benefit for contributions to entities perceived as the tools of special interests-PACs-outweigh any
advantage in mobilization, particularly because we are convinced that federal candidates and parties are
sophisticated enough to take advantage of the tax credit to increase their donor base.
242. Between 1995 and 2002, the Democratic-Farmers-Labor (DFL) Party of Minnesota saw its
fundraising attributable to the refunds rise from $422,000 to $700,000. During the same time, the
Republican Party of Minnesota saw its fundraising attributable from refunds rise from $679,000 to
$2,400,000. Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board, Participation in Political
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have been disappointed at the ability of state and local parties to market the
state refund programs, 243 this aspect of the state experience may not
generalize well to the federal level. National parties tend to be more
sophisticated at mobilizing voters and devising campaign strategies than
state parties. 2' Finally, parties and candidates will not have to go it alone.
The effort to market the tax credit to eligible citizens will find allies in tax
software programs and tax preparers who will likely encourage individuals
to take the tax credit and reduce their tax payments or increase their
refunds. Unlike the tax check-off program funding the presidential system,
this tax subsidy actually affects the taxpayer's bottom line, so it is in the
interest of tax preparers and designers of tax preparation programs to bring
245
a refundable tax credit to the attention of their clients.
One aspect of the design of the tax credit creates the possibility of
another systemic benefit. With an annual April 15 deadline for a tax credit
for contributions, it is likely that we will see more campaign giving not
only in the early spring, but also in off-election years, thus potentially
smoothing the political giving cycle. Candidates, recognizing this, are also
likely to spend more time and money educating voters about the tax credit
during this time. Moreover, with more mobilization in the off-years, it is
likely that citizens would be more interested in public policy during the
nonelection years. In Minnesota, the amount of money raised through
contribution refunds by political parties has been steadily rising over time
and is smoother than the pattern observed at the federal level.24 6 Although
candidate fundraising in Minnesota is cyclical, the steady flow of
contributions received by parties tends to even out the overall cyclicality of
giving. In election years, parties raise roughly an equivalent amount of
funds as candidates and from roughly the same number of individual
Contribution Refund Program, at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/pcrprog.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Participation].
243.
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 54 (lamenting the lack of political parties' awareness
of the Arkansas program).
244.
See JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 118, 137 (2000)

(contrasting the strength of state and national parties and noting that the former are increasingly reliant
on the national parties for support); HERSHEY & BECK, supra note 231, at 78 (discussing the power of
national parties to raise money, especially from small donors, and contrasting this ability with the
waning power of state party organizations); James L. Gibson, Cornelius P. Cotter, John F. Bibby &
Robert J. Huckshorn, Whither the Local Parties?: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of the
Strength of Party Organizations, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 139, 139-40 (1985) (noting that national parties
are stronger than state parties and have worked to strengthen state parties).
245.
Cf supra text accompanying note 191 (noting that now computer tax-preparation software
usually provides a default of no contribution, and thus requires an affirmative decision by the taxpayer

to make a contribution).
246.

For the Minnesota data, see Participation, supra note 242.
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contributors. In off-years, however, the fundraising by political parties
increases slightly, while the fundraising by candidates attributable to the
refund system declines precipitously. Parties receive247almost two times the
contributions as candidates during off-election years.
While the theory and evidence in social science point to a tax credit
having a positive effect on participation, the actual size of the participation
effect is difficult to estimate empirically. We can, however, use the
previous federal experience with the tax credit to find a modicum of data.
In 1986, when the tax credit was $50, the participation rate was about 5%
of all tax returns.2 48 Keep in mind that the previous tax credit was a 50%
nonrefundable tax credit for political contributions; participation is likely to
be much higher under our proposal because it is a fully refundable credit.
This fundamental difference in the two schemes precludes any accurate
estimate of the effect of our proposal using federal data to determine
participation levels. We can conduct a correlation test, however, to see if an
increase in the size of a tax credit is correlated with an increase in the level
of participation by taxpayers. The result of this correlation test finds that
there is 0.89 correlation between the level of the tax credit and the level of
participation in the tax credit program from 1972 to 1986. This correlation
is statistically significant at the 99% level (n=15), meaning we can be 99%
confident that an increase in the level of a tax credit for political
contributions will increase the number of people participating in the
program for the observed levels of the credit ($12.50 to $50).
Despite these virtues of a tax credit for political contributions, we
recognize that tax policy is not a panacea. Often policymakers believe that
tax incentives will result in substantial changes in behavior. Rather, with
our proposal, we expect the number of people contributing to candidates
and parties to noticeably increase, and that such an increase will primarily
occur with lower- and middle-income Americans, but we do not expect the
tax credit to guarantee political participation by all Americans. Moreover,
with mobilization efforts likely by the parties, we expect spillover effects
from the tax benefit to other aspects of political participation, but again we
do not expect an explosion of participatory democracy.
247. One reason for this may be that most challengers do not declare their intention to run early in
the election season. It could also be the case that contributors are waiting to evaluate the performance of
incumbents.
248. CANTOR, supra note 43, at CRS-31.
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3. Averting Disaster in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Our third and perhaps most pressing goal is to provide a framework
for reform of the nearly insolvent Presidential Election Campaign Fund
system. Reform of this system of public funding is imminent. It became
clear in the 2004 election that the Fund will soon become increasingly
irrelevant (as more candidates opt out), insolvent (as the fund becomes
unable to meet its financial obligations), or both. BCRA did not deal with
the presidential system of public financing in part because it was not clear
until recently that it was seriously broken.2 49 While BCRA did not directly
change the presidential financing system, it may well have exacerbated the
system's decline. Although the matching formula remains unchanged (the
first $250 of individual donations to eligible presidential candidates in the
primary season is matched dollar-for-dollar), the limit on individual
contributions was doubled to $2000 and indexed for inflation, thereby
reducing the relative value of the public money. The distress of the
presidential fund is sufficiently evident that cries of an impending
"collapse" are sounding loudly, 250 and reformers are proposing a series of
25 1
changes as the next item on the federal campaign finance agenda.
We do not intend to address the wisdom of the various specific
reforms proposed to the taxpayer check-off, matching fund formula,
expenditures caps, and other features of the current presidential election
fund system, other than to agree that reform in the near future is necessary
and unavoidable. And we acknowledge that more must be done to save the
imperiled system than merely adopting a refundable tax credit. Instead, we
argue that this moment of broader reform is the time to consider adding, as
part of the presidential campaign finance system and as a component of the
congressional system, a tax provision to further expand participation by
lower- and middle-income Americans. Minnesota, Ohio, Arizona, and
Virginia have both a tax credit for political donations and a taxpayer checkoff to send money to a fund disbursed by the government. Indeed, a system
along the lines of the current presidential regime that also includes a tax
credit promises to increase participation in politics by taxpayers who would
249. See Cummings, supra note 8 ("The irony is that until recent years the presidential-campaign
system appeared to be the one area of campaign-finance law that was working well.").
250. See, e.g., Public Campaign FinancingCollapses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at Al.
251. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS, supranote 9, at 54-58 (suggesting reforms);
McCain, supra note 7, at 120-21 (same); Overton, supra note 18, at 107 (proposing in addition to a
refundable tax credit a 4-to-I match of donations of $100 or less to federal candidates, parties, and
PACs). But see JOHN SAMPLES,

THE FAILURES OF TAXPAYER FINANCING

OF PRESIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGNS (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 500, 2003) (acknowledging that the system is broken, but
challenging the effectiveness of proposed reforms).
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not be as likely to participate without a tax credit, and it will direct public
money to more candidates and political parties than can receive public
money under the current system.
A campaign financing system expanded to include a refundable tax
credit promises to increase participation. Currently, only taxpayers with tax
liability have the opportunity to send $3 to the presidential fund. The
refundable tax credit we propose would be available to taxpayers who owe
no taxes and therefore cannot participate in this element of public
financing. The tax credit would appear on tax return forms along with other
tax credits that reduce tax liability or result in a refund, and thus it will be
more salient to taxpayers than the check-off. Finally, taxpayers who want
to play a more active role in directing public money to particular candidates
and parties they support will find the tax credit more appealing than the
check-off, which sends money to a government bureaucracy that then
disburses it according to a formula. There will certainly be taxpayers
eligible for the credit who will also participate in the check-off program,
but we think that the tax credit will also be used by people who have not
previously participated in the presidential system because they do not owe
taxes, follow the default decisions of tax programs and tax preparers, or
want more control over which politicians benefit from their money.
The tax credit will also send public money to some candidates and
political parties that do not benefit significantly from the current system.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund sends the vast bulk of its money
to the two major parties and their candidates. Few candidates from minor
parties have qualified for public money, and new parties and their
candidates have no hope of receiving money before an election, although a
strong showing in the general election may allow them to receive a postelection subsidy. Although this bias in favor of the two major parties occurs
partly because the campaign laws are written by legislators who belong to
the major parties,2 52 it is also partly driven by the view that a strong twoparty system allows for more political legitimacy. Although that view is
contested, 3 a political system dominated by two parties is not an
unreasonable design for a well-functioning democracy (although it is not
the only possible design compatible with democracy).
252.

See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan

Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (discussing other aspects of the

electoral system that arise as part of a strategy by the two major parties to "lock up" government).
253. Compare LISA JANE DISCH, THE TYRANNY OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM (2002) (advocating
a system of many parties that is more robust than the two-party system), with Bruce E. Cain, Party
Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (2001) (supporting the two-

party system as necessary for a well-functioning democratic process).
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Adding to the current political system a tax credit that could allow
taxpayers to allocate some public money to independent candidates and
third parties and their candidates is a way to add to the diversity of voices
without significantly undermining the strength of the two major parties. It
is an attractive way to send public money to candidates outside the major
parties because it is tied directly to the grassroots support the candidates
receive. It also benefits such candidates during the campaign for office,
rather than holding out the promise of public money after the election if the
minor party can muster a strong showing after a campaign run without the
benefit of a government subsidy. Even in a system largely designed to
favor two strong parties as the United States' electoral system is, minor
parties and independent candidates can induce change in established
parties. For there to be meaningful "voice" within a major party, there must
be some realistic "exit" possibility.2 54 Enacting a tax credit that may be
used for donations to minor parties and independents is one way to enhance
the related tools of voice and exit while not undermining political stability
to any significant degree. In Minnesota, for example, two minor parties, the
Green Party and the Independence Party, received campaign contributions
under the refund system, and the Minnesota political system is stable.
Although the reform of the presidential system presents an opportunity
to consider adopting a tax credit for political contributions as part of the
overhaul, the tax credit should not be limited to contributions to
presidential campaigns. It should more broadly encourage wider
participation through modest donations in all federal campaigns for office.
Indeed, if the current presidential campaign funding structure is retained,
the major candidates who opt into public financing cannot accept
individual donations during the general election campaign, so only
contributions to party organizations and congressional candidates during
this period would trigger the tax credit. The collapse of the presidential
system of public financing provides a focal point for larger reform and,
because public financing is already an established part of the presidential
system, it is a promising opportunity to discuss other ways of injecting
public money into the electoral process.2 55 A tax credit is a decentralized
254. Albert Hirschman argued that one means of promoting a healthy political system would be to
allow for a mix of exit and voice; after all, voice will be less effective in achieving internal reform if the
discontented members have no realistic option to leave the organization. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
ExiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4

(1970).
255. Our proposal is a method for injecting millions of dollars of public money into the
presidential campaigns either in concert with, or exclusive of, the current system. Consider individuals
who allocate one-third of their money to the congressional race, one-third to the Senate race, and one-
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mechanism of public financing that empowers eligible voters to send up to
$100 in public money to the candidates and parties of their choice. Not
only will this increase the kind of participation encouraged by the current
presidential system-matching only the first $250 of political contributions
encourages candidates to target smaller donations-but it promises to bring
a new group of citizens into the system.
4. Consensus, Bipartisan Support
Our fourth and final goal is primarily political. Our proposal is a
market-based tax credit for the public financing of campaigns. This has a
number of attractive properties for the politicians who will have to enact
any proposal. First, the tax system is constantly revised, updated, and
changed by Congress, and it includes scores of tax provisions designed to
alter taxpayer behavior by subsidizing certain decisions. Hence, the tax
code is a familiar vehicle for legislators to use when attempting to change
citizen behavior. Garnering broad support for a reform is more likely if
lawmakers are comfortable with its familiar features and can better predict
how people will react to the new structures. Legislative change can also be
portrayed as less dramatic when it draws on or amends structures already in
place rather than establishing entirely new arrangements.2 56 Second, tax
and budget bills are often points of compromise because these bills, unlike
many other bills, are viewed by lawmakers and the president as legislative
vehicles that must be passed.2 57
Constructing this public subsidy as a tax provision also makes it
unusually attractive to a bipartisan coalition in Congress. The public
financing aspects of the proposal will likely be particularly attractive to
Democrats, who often fight for public funding of campaigns. Politicians of
both parties sometimes prefer to structure public subsidies in the form of
tax expenditures rather than new programs that require appropriated
money. Any casual analysis of the tax bills passed during the Bush
third to the presidential race. Even if there is only a 10% participation rate in our proposal, the tax credit
system will raise eleven times more public funds for presidential campaigns than will the $3 matching
fund system alone. Put differently, more money will flow into presidential campaigns, which will
facilitate the democratic process.
256.

Cf

JAMES

G.

MARCH

& JOHAN P. OLSEN,

REDISCOVERING

INSTITUTIONS:

THE

ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 25 (1989) (observing that more familiar rules are more likely to
be invoked by political players, and rules that have been recently used or revised tend to be at the
forefront of legislative attention).
257. See JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO, THE TIMING, INTENSITY, AND COMPOSITION OF INTEREST
GROUP LOBBYING: AN ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL POLICY WINDOWS IN THE STATES 8 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10588, 2004) (discussing how budget bills often become "must

pass" bills for Congress and thus become the focus of interest group lobbying).
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administration, the revenue proposals offered by Senator Kerry in the 2004
election, and those supported by President Clinton during his term in office
reveals that, in certain cases, politicians will support policy implemented
through the tax code even when they might not support direct government
outlays for the same purpose. Different budget rules apply to tax bills that
may make passing tax subsidies easier than passing programs that require
appropriated money. The preference for establishing programs through the
tax code may also reflect another budget reality: most tax expenditures
result only in revenue loss to the government and not in outlays from the
government. Thus, they are ways to implement federal programs without
appearing to make the government larger.
Lawmakers often prefer the structure of a tax provision even for
refundable tax credits that ultimately require some federal outlays to those
taxpayers without offsetting tax liability. For example, the refundable
Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC")25 8 was originally supported as an
alternative to traditional welfare programs by President Nixon, enacted
2 59
under President Ford, and expanded in 1993 under President Clinton.
Perhaps the explanation for the ability of tax subsidies to gain broad
consensus support lies in the nature of tax provisions like our proposal. The
market-based aspects to the tax credit are particularly attractive to
Republicans who often view such decentralized mechanisms implemented
through the tax code as the optimal means for altering behavior; for
I.R.C. § 32 (2000).
The EITC was first inspired by the idea of the "negative income tax." See MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191-95 (1962) (discussing the benefits of the negative income
tax in alleviating poverty). It was enacted during the Ford administration in the Tax Reduction Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975). For an early history, see Jonathan Barry Foreman,
Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Creditfor the Working Poor, 16
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 47-52 (1988). It was a substantial component of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, the first major tax and budget bill enacted during the Clinton
administration. There seems to be broad-based support across ideological and political lines for the
refundable EITC. See, e.g., The Earned Income Tax Credit Is a Refundable Tax Credit That Helps Lift
Low-Income Working Families out of Poverty, STATE EITC ONLINE RESEARCH CENTER, at
http://www.stateeitc.org/documents/oklahoma/OKEITactsheet6-pg.doc (last visited Feb. 17, 2005)
(noting that Presidents Ford, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton all supported and expanded the EITC). Some
Republicans also mounted an attack on refundability as incompatible with the tax system, arguing that
only those with tax liability should receive tax subsidies. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S9569b (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Sen. Nickles) (objecting to the use of the tax system to "write you a check
for taxes you didn't pay" in a debate on child credit extension); Edmund L. Andrews, Deal in Congress
to Keep Tax Cuts, Widening Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at A6 (noting Nickles's comments that
tax credits should only be for taxpayers and that welfare is a separate program). We believe that this
argument was used strategically to keep the costs of the tax bill down and to defeat the Democrats'
effort to expand the Child Tax Credit, which had been a Democratic addition to the Bush tax proposals
when they were originally enacted. Republicans have not been ideologically opposed to refundability in
the past, as their support for the EITC demonstrates.
258.
259.
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example, the charitable deduction obtains nearly universal support in part
because of its design. Republicans also see tax expenditures as ways to
return money to taxpayers that belongs to them in the first place; many
resist the very notion of a tax "expenditure." 260 In short, bipartisanship in
this arena is possible because of the structure of our proposal. 2 6' Moreover,
its simplicity and its reliance on an existing agency to administer it should
be attractive to politicians on both sides of the aisle as well.
We expect bipartisan, consensus support partly because so many
different people and groups are now advocating adoption of a federal tax
credit for donations. The American Enterprise Institute and the U.S. Public
Interest Research Group, groups with very different ideological
commitments, have both recently published research papers arguing in
favor of some sort of tax credit, although they disagree on the details. There
may be a few bumps in the legislative road for any proposal, however.
First, to the extent that politicians expect that the people who will respond
to the tax incentive will favor candidates or parties other than those in
power, they will be less enthusiastic about enactment. For example, if
incumbents are convinced that lower- and middle-income Americans are
likely to favor different sorts of platforms and policies, they may be wary
of change. Or members of the political party who expect fewer of the new
participants to favor them may be less likely to vote for a tax credit.
Ironically, the fact that only modest improvements in participation are
likely in the short run may actually make the tax credit more politically
viable, allowing political entrepreneurs to then market the provision and
increase participation over time.
Second, the budget deficit, currently the largest in nominal terms in
our history, makes any tax expenditure more difficult to pass, and the
outlays required by a refundable credit increase its cost. We discuss the
likely loss in revenue below, and we do not believe that the revenue effect
of the provision is substantial enough to eliminate any chance of
enactment. But it is certainly true that budget realities may begin to slow
260.
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S5216 (1996) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("What are tax
expenditures and corporate loopholes? Frankly, there are two ways to look at it. One way to think about

it is that they were taxes that the Government owned, and we said we are not going to collect them.
That is a Democrat version of a tax expenditure. The other version is they belong to the taxpayer and
not the Government."); Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax ExpendituresList, 91
TAX NOTES 535 (2001) (noting that the Bush administration has referred to tax expenditures as "socalled tax expenditures" and has questioned the theory behind the concept).

261. As one piece of evidence, Senators Dorgan (D-ND) and Warner (R-VA) co-sponsored a
proposal in Congress to introduce a tax credit for political contributions similar to the previous federal
credit. See supra text accompanying note 196.
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the passage of tax cut bills in the next few years, even if Congress has not
recently exhibited a great deal of fiscal discipline.
B. A RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL CRITICS
Because we are claiming to present a pragmatic solution that can be
implemented in the real world of politics, we must address three potential
critiques of our proposal. The first is that the expense will be too high. If
30% of the 175 million eligible taxpayers participate up to the maximum of
$100 per taxpayer, there would be a loss to the government in total tax
revenue of $5.25 billion per year.262 In Minnesota, which provides a fully
263
refundable credit, the average claim was $57.73 of the $100 maximum.
Taking this percentage and multiplying by the 52.5 million Americans who
we can estimate a cost of our proposal of
might participate in the tax credit,
264
billion.
$3.031
approximately
Data from the states' experience with tax credit programs offer a
second method of calculating the costs of our proposal. Although no statelevel program is identical to our proposal, the states generally have not
found these programs to be prohibitively expensive. 265 On a per capita
262. There were 77.3 million individual tax returns and 51 million joint tax returns filed in 2001.
Assume that 2.1% of the individual tax returns and 4.2% of the joint tax returns are not eligible because
they are above the AGI limitations. This means that 126.2 million individual returns and 48.8 million
joint returns are eligible. The joint returns have two filers, however, so a total of 175 million taxpayers
would be eligible for the credit. If 30% of these 175 million eligible tax payers took the entire credit,
then 52.5 million individuals would claim the deduction. The loss in tax revenue to the government
would be $5.25 billion (52.5 million x $100). For the statistics on returns, see 2001 Individual Income
Tax, supra note 211.
263. To arrive at this 57.73% figure, we used the data from Participation,supra note 242. We
looked at Minnesota contributions for two years (2002-2003) to candidates and parties alike. The total
amount of refunds granted for these two years was $11,128,761. Divided by the total number of claims
made, 192,783, the average claim provided a $57.73 refund.
264. Rosenberg has conducted the only other study we are aware of that tries to estimate the cost
of the tax credit. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 67. He estimates that the cost will average just under
$400 million per year for a tax credit of $100 per individual ($200 per couple) with a $100,000
household income limit. Our estimates are substantially higher than his because we assume much higher
participation rates. We anticipate higher participation rates for several reasons: previous federal tax
credits achieved greater than 5% participation; advances in tax preparation software have occurred;
there is now higher party mobilization of citizens; our tax credit is fully refundable; and our tax credit is
for the entire donation, rather than just 50%, as is common in some states and was the law in the earlier
federal program. If every eligible individual took advantage of the full tax credit, the loss in federal tax
revenue would amount to $17.5 billion. We try to provide more realistic estimates in the text.
265. In Minnesota, the program costs about $11 million per year. In Arizona, the cost is about $4
million per year, see CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMM'N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2002); in Ohio,
it is about $3 million per year, see DEP'T OF TAXATION, STATE OF OHIO, EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2002 AND 2003, BOOK TWO, TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT 54 (2001); and in Oregon, it is
approximately $8.6 million per year, see STATE OF OR., TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT 2001-2003, at 329
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basis, the state refunds and tax credits cost no more than about $2 per
person. If we extrapolate this to the entire United States, the total cost
would be $600 million. Even if we assume much higher participation rates
because of more sophisticated mobilization by federal parties and
candidates, more effective voter education, and a more robust incentive
provided by a fully refundable tax credit, and therefore increase these
figures five-fold, the cost remains close to our $3 billion estimate.
In addition to these rough estimates, we can obtain a third estimate by
examining the federal data from 1972 to 1986. We have run a regression
with "total cost of the tax credit program" on the left hand side as our
dependent variable, and "value of the tax credit" on the right hand side.
This regression indicates that during this time period, .every $1 increase in
the tax credit resulted in a $6.1 million loss in tax revenue by the federal
government. 266 This suggests that a $100 tax credit will result in a $600
million loss in tax revenue by the federal government. One problem with
this regression, however, is that the previous tax subsidy was only a 50%
tax credit for political contributions. We would expect a more inelastic
giving rate in the context of a full tax credit. 267 Thus, we would expect a
proposal such as ours to cost more than the previous proposal, but it would
still be within the costs we projected above. Even quadrupling this estimate
based on experience with the prior federal provision results in a cost of
$2.4 billion.26 8
(2004). One must be careful when analyzing these figures because these programs are not identical to
our proposal.
266. We provide this OLS regression only as one additional piece of evidence on the cost of our
program, rather than a definitive estimate because the regression has only fifteen observations. The
data, however, are quite good and interesting. The coefficient on "value of the tax credit" is statistically
significant at the 95% level (t-statistic is 2.22), even with only fifteen observations. The result is (tstatistics in parentheses):
Total Tax Revenue Loss = -67,045,727 + 6,050,238 x Tax Credit Amount
(12.63)
(3.58)
267. The previous program contained only a 50% tax credit. Thus, for every $25 contributed, the
taxpayer actually bore $12.50 in cost; for a $50 contribution, the taxpayer bore $25 in cost. Our
proposal lowers the cost of giving. For the same $25 contribution, the taxpayer would incur $0 cost, and
for a $50 contribution, $0 in cost. Thus, the money supply curve is completely inelastic from $0 to $100
with our proposal. It is extraordinarily difficult to offer a point estimate of the cost of this program. We
know that the range of the cost would be $0 (if nobody participated) to $17.5 billion (if everyone
participated to the fullest extent possible). We have used what we believe to be some reasonable
assumptions to determine the cost. To the extent that cost is higher, it will mean that the program is
more successful.
268. Limiting eligibility for the tax credit to those under an income cap further reduces the cost of
the proposal, while also targeting the benefit to those who do not currently contribute to campaigns.
Although a phase-out of the credit would further reduce its costs, we believe that a phase-out is not
justified given the additional complexity it would pose. See supra note 210.
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While $3 billion to support participation in the democratic process by
be
people not active now may seem like a substantial outlay, it must 269
budget.
federal
trillion
$2.4
the
of
context
larger
the
in
considered
Moreover, comparing the cost of the tax credit for political contributions
with other tax expenditures helps put the revenue loss in perspective: $3
billion is 7.5% of the total cost of the charitable contribution deduction and
still less than the cost of the exception from passive loss rules for $25,000
of rental loss. 27 0 Seen in the context of the other major tax expenditures in
the Internal Revenue Code, $3 billion to increase participation in the
democratic process would seem like a "good deal." In addition, the cost of
our proposal compares favorably to the Ackerman and Ayres voucher
27 1
scheme with the secret donation booth; they project a cost of $5 billion.
A second concern that may arise in this proposal is that we inject more
money into politics, and that the money comes in too early in the election
cycle. In our view, more money spent for campaigns is not necessarily a
bad thing-it all depends on the source of the money injected into the
system. Considering the importance of political decisions and governance,
relatively little money is spent on politics. 272 The problem is where the
money to pay for politics comes from and the effect that mix of funding has
on electoral integrity and policymaking. Money from ordinary citizens who
do not traditionally participate and who represent a broad cross-section of
the economy is a positive development for politics. The decentralized
nature of a tax credit puts the power in the hands of the people. Individuals
will open their purses to candidates they like and close their purses to
people they do not. This market will serve to discipline politicians with
respect to their advertising patterns and the content of their political
communications. 273 Indeed, to the extent that political advertising is
269. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 365 tbl.S-I
(2004), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudgetlfy2005/pdf/budgetltables.pdf.
270. See id. at 294-95 (providing revenue effect of income tax expenditures currently in the code).
See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that if Congress provided each voter
271.
with a "Patriot card" seeded with $50, to help finance candidates, the cost would be $5 billion).
272. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 23, at 110 (comparing political expenditures to federal
spending and the costs of compliance with regulation); Milyo et al., supra note 216, at 83-84
(comparing corporations' charitable giving to their political contributions); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049,

1060 (1996) (comparing the money spent on political campaigns with the money spent in the annual
advertising budgets of only two companies, Procter & Gamble and Philip Morris).
273. Some who have provided us comments on this paper have been disturbed about the prospect
of more money in politics particularly if it is used by politicians and parties for advertising that is
manipulative, negative, or otherwise undesirable. Of course, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, under
current First Amendment jurisprudence to dictate the content of political communications as part of the
eligibility determination to receive contributions that qualify for the tax credit. Moreover, there is
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informative and stimulates additional discussion about issues and
candidates, then more money in politics is a welcome outcome of our
proposal. Moreover, money will likely result in broader get-out-the-vote
drives by candidates and political parties, and these mobilization efforts
will make it easier for citizens to participate in a variety of different
activities in the electoral process.
Related to the argument that a tax credit would bring in too much
money is the concern that it encourages people to give in the spring, close
to the time that they would receive a refund from the government through
the tax system. We have previously discussed some benefits to this change
in timing.2" 4 The effect of early giving, however, is not unambiguously
positive, some argue, because voters will not have much information about
candidates or campaigns so early in the year and in the election cycle. They
will thus be unduly swayed by factors like the name recognition of
incumbents; moreover, only incumbents and established parties will have
the resources and organization to target such early contributions.
We share the larger concern about competitiveness in politics, but note
that this unfortunate phenomenon is the product of much larger forces in
the electoral system such as incumbent-protecting gerrymanders.2 75 Much
more sweeping reforms such as changing the selection of party nominees
and moving redistricting decisions out of state legislatures will be required
to increase competitiveness. Moreover, to the extent that congressional
districts are now drawn to ensure that the nominee of the dominant political
party faces no real competition in the general election, then encouraging
more voters to pay attention earlier in the election cycle during the primary
campaigns may be beneficial. Increasingly, the only competition for seats
in the House of Representatives occurs in the primaries. In addition,
independent candidates and challengers would presumably change their
behavior to take advantage of this new source of early money, perhaps
using the Internet to raise money close to April 15 from people who can
disagreement about what kind of advertisement should be discouraged. For example, many decry socalled negative advertising, but it is likely that such ads are among the most effective and perhaps the
most informative to voters. Perhaps eligibility could be tied to requirements such as a commitment to
participate in public debates, although some candidates who could take tax-credit-eligible contributions
might not be invited to candidate debates if they do not belong to major parties or do not have relatively
substantial support in the polls. In the end, we believe that this proposal should not seek to change the
content of political discourse; it is sufficient (and perhaps enough) that it encourages broader
participation and uses decentralized, market-based tools to affect political campaigns.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 246-247.
275. For a discussion of such gerrymanders and potential reforms, see Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 594 (2002).
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qualify for the tax credit. Finally, we note that the experience in Minnesota
suggests that parties take advantage of the increased interest in making
political contributions throughout the year, 276 rather than candidates, so it is
more likely that those who donate close to April 15 may target their money
to parties and not candidates.
A final concern comes from the opposite direction: with the
proliferation of money, the argument goes, there will also be a proliferation
of candidates. As we suggested earlier, offering citizens more choices
among candidates might be a good thing. 277 Candidates who, on the
margin, choose not to enter politics because of fundraising concerns will
now have an incentive do so, particularly if they think they will attract
grassroots support. We also protect against too much party fragmentation in
our largely two-party political system. Although taxpayers will not be
limited to contributing to the candidates of the two major parties, there will
still be rules about which candidates and parties will qualify for favored tax
treatment. Formulating these rules will not be especially challenging given
the regulatory structures already in place. The Presidential Election
Campaign Fund system includes definitions of major, minor, and new
278
parties, which could be a starting place for the tax credit's definitions.
The previous federal tax credit and deduction included definitions for
eligible parties and candidates that turned on state ballot access laws and
qualifications for office. 27 9 Likewise, states have rules to 28determine
0
eligibility of parties for public money that could serve as models.
We can use these systems already in place, modifying them to apply to
congressional elections as necessary, to insure that only credible, serious
parties and candidates are able to take advantage of the tax credit program.
Certainly, our proposal will increase the amount of public funds going to
candidates and parties other than the major ones, relative to the current
system, which sends virtually no money to minor parties and independent
candidates. We believe, however, that this change will stimulate political
276. See supra text accompanying note 247.
277. See supratext accompanying notes 252-254 (discussing the merits of a multi-party system in
the context of the presidential public financing system).
278. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, I.R.C. § 9002(7)-(8) (2000) (providing
definitions of minor and new parties).
279. See, e.g., id. § 24(c) (1987) (providing the definition of "political contribution" in an old tax
credit statute that defined eligible parties and candidates).
280. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 10A.01 (2003) (defining eligible candidates and parties in the refund
program), available at http:llwww.revisor.leg.state.mn.usstats/lOA. See also MINNESOTA CAMPAIGN
FINANCE AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2003) (providing references that

include detailed description of the rules in Minnesota), available at http://cfboard.mn.us/campfin/
2003ar.pdf.
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debate and discussion without providing such a substantial subsidy to
minor party and independent candidates that it would threaten to undermine
the stability of the current two-party system.
Finally, any concern about fragmentation must be balanced against the
previous concern that a tax credit actually strengthens parties and
candidates already in power because they have name recognition and
organization sufficient to attract the new money. 281 It is difficult to gauge
which of all the cross-cutting arguments have more force because we have
no experience with a generous, refundable tax credit on the federal level,
and the state experience is sufficiently different to defy easy extrapolation.
If the concern about competitiveness is right and the main beneficiaries of a
tax credit will be incumbents, then bipartisan and enthusiastic support for
the tax credit is more likely, and concerns about undermining the two-party
system can be dismissed. If the decentralized nature of the reform
encourages individuals to give to independent and minor-party candidates
and these new participants in the campaign system have different
preferences than current participants, then competitiveness will be
enhanced. But, in that case, enactment will be more difficult. In the end,
although we believe that there is some uncertainty about the consequences
of the tax credit, it does seem clear that to the extent the proposal further
marginalizes special interest money and enhances participation in
democratic electoral politics, it should be considered a good investment of
the country's resources.
V. CONCLUSION
A refundable tax credit for political contributions by lower- and
middle-income Americans is not a complete cure for anemic participation
in civic life, but it is a pragmatic element of the solution. It relies on a
familiar policy tool-a tax incentive-and it will be administered in a
straightforward way involving an established bureaucracy. It is intuitively
appealing, and it will harness the energy of political parties and candidates
who will help educate voters about the tax subsidy as part of their quest for
hard dollars and expanded donor bases. The power of our proposal lies in
its simplicity and its result. Not only does it further marginalize special
interest campaign contributions, but it levels up the playing field by
281.

See Pildes, supra note 169, at 152-53 (noting that proposals like tax credits that seek to

increase participation should also be designed to promote competitiveness); Cmar, supra note 18, at 2829 (providing data from the Minnesota refund system showing that "a candidate's status as an
incumbent and success at raising [money other than that subject to refund] show strong relationships" to
the ability to raise money through the refund system).
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increasing participation of individuals with modest means in the process of
paying for politics. Moreover, it has sound democratic propertiesencouraging grassroots political participation by ordinary Americans. In
this way it is consistent with the objectives of legislative reformers, and it
builds on the new strand in Supreme Court jurisprudence that sees
democratization of the political process as an important state interest
grounded in the First Amendment. Finally, our proposal could serve as part
of the answer to the serious and worsening problems of the presidential
campaign financing system, which is clearly a next step in election reform.
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